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Resumen 
Esta tesis es una aproximación empírica desde de los Estudios Sociales de la Ciencia a las 
lecciones que los residentes de psiquiatría experimentan durante su formación en lo 
concerniente a las clasificaciones estandarizadas (DSM y CIE). Primero se realiza una 
discusión de la literatura que desde los Estudios Sociales de la Ciencia ha abordado la 
formación científica y los estándares; posteriormente esta discusión es utilizada para 
comprender el caso concreto de una etnografía llevada a cabo en un programa de formación 
en psiquiatría en el cual son aprendidas formas particulares de entender los estándares 
psiquiátricos; finalmente se dejan esbozados futuros caminos de investigación para seguir 
trabajando en la relaciones entre los Estudios Sociales de la Ciencia, los estándares 
psiquiátricos y la formación científica.  
Palabras clave: Estudios Sociales de la Ciencia, etnografía de las prácticas científicas,     
formación científica y estándares psiquiátricos. 
Abstract 
This thesis is an empirical approximation from the Science and Technology Studies to the 
lessons that psychiatry residents experience during their training regarding standardized 
classifications (DSM and ICD). Initially the Science and Technology Studies’ literature 
concerning scientific training and standards is discussed; posteriorly this discussion is used to 
understand the ethnography of a psychiatry training program in which particular ways of 
understanding psychiatric standards are learned; finally, future directions of research are 
outlined to continue the work on the relationships between Science and Technology Studies, 
scientific training and psychiatric standards. 
Key words: Science and Technology Studies, ethnography of the scientific practices and 
psychiatric standards. 
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Introduction: From epistemology to the social 
construction of knowledge  
As a graduate psychologist, I was trained in a strong epistemological tradition in which I 
learned to evaluate the coherence between the subject, the object and the method of the 
different psychological schools. In this tradition, I also learned to demarcate the good from the 
bad science and the rational from the irrational (social) components of knowledge. 
When I began my training in Science and Technology Studies (STS), the things that once felt 
certain started to fall apart: If the construction of knowledge always happens in concrete 
contexts can a general theory about science be sustained? If the demarcation between good 
and bad science is not determined by the nature of things but by sociotechnical contingencies 
how can I identify what knowledge is trustworthy? If knowledge is the product of the 
hybridization between the social and the technical is it possible to separate the logical from 
the social in the construction of knowledge? Finally, does this lack of solid ground mean that I 
need to abandon all the attempts of knowing? The answers that I constructed inside my STS 
collective were that for me it was time to understand science as a sociotechnical enterprise 
similar to others such as politics or even religion, to construct less definitive categories, to 
practice the construction of knowledge beyond rigid categories such as good and bad science; 
ultimately, to change my entire relationship with knowledge.   
One of the STS arguments that I embraced to deal with these unstable arenas was to 
understand that the sort of epistemic commitments that I sustained before are the product of 
long socialization processes inside collectives that train scientists to enact particular 
epistemological positions, to perceive reality in certain way and to use similar methods. 
Knowledge and truth were not anymore general dimensions but relative practices that 
depend on the socialization in particular collectives.   
In this order of ideas, the thesis that you are about to read is not an evaluative but a 
constructive one. It will not tell you if there is coherence between the subject, the object and 
the method of psychiatry, nor if the psychiatric standards are good or bad, nor if there are 
negative social influences in the rational elaboration of standards; instead, this text is about 
the way in which the psychiatry residents are trained to sustain these kinds of demarcations. 
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Now, the regulations of the STS master which I am coursing demand for theses to have three 
chapters: The state of the art, an empirical chapter and a short description of possible 
chapters to continue the work on the topic of the theses in a future Ph.D. dissertation. 
According to these regulations, the present thesis is divided into three chapters: The first 
chapter discusses the STS literature concerning scientific training and standards. The second 
chapter uses an ethnographical approach to address the lessons that the residents of a 
particular psychiatry training program learn about the psychiatric standards. And the third 
chapter outlines future research directions on the relationships among STS, scientific training 
and psychiatric standards. Additionally, there are transversal reflections about how this thesis 
is a social construction.         
Finally, by reading a colleague’s thesis (Mora, 2012), I realized that I must explain why this 
thesis is written in English. On that occasion Mora argued that there is not an easy answer 
inasmuch his goal was not to get into matters such as the North-South relationships or the 
power of scientific communities; instead his motives were to have a better communication 
with his advisor who does not speak Spanish fluently and to improve his competences in the 
language. I entirely share these reasons, since we have the same advisor and decisions of 
carrying on with my studies in other countries are just around the corner. 
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1. Scientific training, standards and psychiatric 
standardized classifications in an ethnography of 
the scientific practices   
In the first chapter STS literature about scientific training and standards is discussed. 
Specifically, it includes the concepts, case studies and methodological guidelines that helped 
me perform the ethnography presented in the second chapter.   
1.1 Scientific training as a social process  
More than the accumulation of technical and conceptual skills, in the present thesis the 
scientific training is understood as a socialization practice. One of the first scholars who 
sustained this idea was Ludwik Fleck (1986). For Fleck, scientists have to pass through long 
socialization processes to be part of what he called thought collectives. A thought collective is 
a group that shares a thought style, it means that its members are capable of being interested 
in the same problems, recognize the judgments that their collective consider evident, handle 
similar methods and use a similar technical and literary style1.  
It has been argued (Campbell, 2003) that Fleck proposed science as an especial epistemic 
enterprise not accessible to everyone in which the thought collectives are “self-contained” 
groups without any interaction. I disagree with these critiques because Fleck claimed that 
science is not accessible to everyone, not for an extraordinary and inherent epistemological 
quality, but because being a scientist requires a long socialization that implies sharing a 
particular thought style; therefore, those who have not passed by this socialization will not 
able to fully understand scientific facts in the same terms of those who belong to a thought 
collective2. Likewise, Fleck argued in favor of the transformation of thought styles through the 
flux of ideas between esoteric and exoteric circles by scientists’ membership to more than one 
thought collective; hence, thought collectives are not impermeable or “self-contained”.   
Other of the scholars who has addressed the relationship between scientific training and 
                                                          
1 Following Fleck, Thomas Kuhn (2000) proposed the concept of paradigm. A paradigm is a specific way of 
practicing science shared by a scientific community; those who share a paradigm use the same concepts, methods, 
instruments and even perceive reality in a similar way. 
2 This does not mean that outsiders are not able to produce judgments over scientific facts, but they will 
understand them according to their own socialization.   
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socialization is Polanyi (2005); particularly, he has tackled this issue with his concept of tacit 
knowledge. According to Polanyi, tacit knowledge is a practical knowledge that can only be 
acquired in local circumstances by experience and the guidance of masters. For example, you 
may receive instructions for swimming, playing piano, tasting wines or riding a bike; but these 
instructions are not enough to do it successfully, you will also need practice and the guidance 
of someone who already knows how to do it. 
Like Fleck, Polanyi has been widely discussed by many scholars. For example, it has been said 
that Polanyi insists too much on authority, the personal nature of knowledge and the 
inarticulate constitution of craft skills (Olesko, 1993; Ray, 2009; Collins, 2010). For Olesko this 
has two consequences: 1) It denies students the possibility of examining their own thinking 
and 2) it constructs a view of scientific training filled with mystery and secrecy near to 
supernatural conceptions. Regarding these critiques, I do not consider that the concept of tacit 
knowledge leads us to obscurantism; instead, Polanyi is claiming that not everything can be 
fully explained by rational means, but it does not mean that he is against rationality.   
Influenced by Polanyi, other scholars have studied tacit knowledge and its relationship with 
scientific training. In this sense, Prentice (2007) has argued that scientific training is a matter 
of social reproduction in which technical skills and their respective social meanings are taught 
simultaneously. Likewise, Olesko (1993) has claimed that it is a combination of explicit and 
tacit knowledge. 
In regard to how technical lessons and social meanings are taught simultaneously, there is the 
case of surgical training. According to Prentice (2007) persons are transformed into surgeons 
through the discipline of the body and the reinforcements of the social hierarchy; Let us see 
an example of her ethnographic work: During an orthopedic surgery, a surgeon asked a 
medical student to use a drill with his left hand, the medical student did not want to because 
he was right-handed but the surgeon insisted. After the surgery, the surgeon explained the 
student that when he had the drill on his right hand the whole positioning of his body in front 
the patient was wrong; then, by using his left hand the positioning got a lot better. For 
Prentice this lesson implies two components: 1) it makes the student unfamiliar with his own 
body and pushes him into a complete different discipline in which he is not used to acting, 
and; 2) it reinforces the social hierarchy in which the surgeon is at the top as the person who 
knows (a role model) and the student is at the bottom as the person who does not know much 
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about the practice.       
Concerning explicit and tacit knowledge, STS scholars have argued the following: On the one 
hand, explicit knowledge is information in form of codes, words, formulas and symbols, it can 
be transmitted by impersonal media such as written documents or computer files and it can 
be acquired through algorithmic strategies such as formal instructions or protocols (Delamont 
and Atkinson, 2001; MacKenzie and Spinardi, 1995). On the other hand, tacit knowledge is 
about mastering techniques without being able to articulate exactly how they are done, it can 
be transmitted only in personal circumstances and it has been compared with socialization 
and enculturation practices that require practical example, guidance, trust in authority, oral 
transmission, trial and error, learning by doing and negotiation among faculty and students 
(Campbell, 2003; Collins, 1974; Delamont and Atkinson, 2001; Polanyi, 2005) 
After these works, Collins (2010) has given a wider treatment to the concept of tacit 
knowledge by classifying it in three forms: Relational (RTK), somatic (STK) and collective tacit 
knowledge (CTK).  
 RTK: This knowledge is tacit because those who have it do not want to or do not know 
how to communicate it. For example, a physicist who has not been able to perform 
successfully a practice in her laboratory just with her colleague’s instructions goes to 
her colleague’s laboratory and realizes that the practice over there was too complex 
to be entirely put into words; finally, thanks to this personal contact, she identified 
what was missing and succeeded in her own laboratory.    
 STK: It is about somatic limitations to learn abilities. For example, balancing a bike 
cannot be learned just by words because it requires a lot of experience to learn how 
to relate the bicycle’s weigh with one’s own body. 
 CTK: This sort of knowledge is about being able to act according to social variations 
depending on the context; Collins calls this “socialness”. For example, balancing a bike 
is a mechanical action that is part of the somatic tacit knowledge; but to know how to 
ride it in different countries, regions, hours and situations is something that requires 
the awareness of specific social rules. Collins claims that the CTK can only be 
absorbed by the experience of being immersed in the social practices of specific 
contexts. 
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1.2 Standards and the construction of social order 
We are constantly dealing with standards in our everyday life without thinking too much 
about it; for example, we go to female/male toilets, we stop when traffic lights are red and we 
show our ID to identify ourselves in front of the authorities. But, are we entirely aware of how 
standards constrain our behavior? Let us discuss these examples:  
 About the standard gender men/women: What would happen if you are classified as a 
woman and try to use the men’s toilet in a mall? Depending on the situation you may 
be politely asked to leave or yelled at to get out.  
 About the standard of traffic lights: What would happen if you pass a red light? 
Sometimes nothing, but you may earn a ticket or produce a car accident.  
 About the standard of using an ID: What would happen if you forget your ID at home 
and you need to enter a public facility? You will have to come back to your house 
because without it you will not be authorized to enter.  
I proposed these examples to point out the role of standards in regulating our daily behavior. 
In front of these cases, someone may argue that these standards are the product of human 
development and it is obvious that we should follow them; nonetheless, this is not always the 
case. For instance, in the first example, what would happen if you identify yourself as a 
crossdresser? What toilet should you use? What will people do if you enter in one or the other 
toilet? In the second case, what happens if you are colorblind? Can you drive? And in the third 
case, what happens if you are homeless and never have got an ID? Can you enter to public 
facilities? Or worse, can you ever aspire to a formal employment? These are some of the 
questions that you may ask if you read STS reflection about standards.   
Perhaps the first STS work which addressed extensively the social and moral implications of 
standards was the book Sorting Things Out by Geoffrey and Susan Leigh Star (1999). In this 
book, Bowker and Star argue that standards are sets of agreed-upon “rules for the production 
of (textual or material) objects” (1999, 13). Also, for these scholars standards are 
characterized by: constructing social and moral orders, going beyond one community of 
practice or site of activity, working across distances, being reinforced by legal bodies, being 
difficult and expensive to modify and being defined by social contingencies (such as being 
constructed in relation to the already stablished standards, aiming for better marketing or the 
approval of the community gatekeepers). 
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In this order of ideas, these scholars propose the following methodological guidelines to study 
standards: 
 Ubiquity: They are everywhere 
 Materiality and texture: they are both material and symbolic  
 Indeterminacy of the past: There are multiple voices in their history, some of these 
voices have been silenced while a single narrative of facts has been constructed; 
however, it is possible to reconstruct this history by taking into account the silenced 
voices. 
 Practical politics: There are always negotiations and decisions about which point of 
view will dominate and which one is going to be dismissed. At the end, the 
negotiations become invisible and merely a technical matter; nevertheless, these 
choices benefit some people and harm others.  
 Convergence: To function it is necessary for standards to work together with other 
standards. 
 Resistance: Things do not always work; sometimes there is resistance of the users 
that makes the social components of standards visible again. 
The following is an example of how psychiatrists from New York resist the psychiatric 
standardized classifications: According to Whooley (2010), historically psychiatrists have 
tried to gain legitimacy for the field with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM); however, the DSM has made them lose professional independence since it 
has allowed other actors (insurance companies, patients and other professionals) to enter 
more easily into the psychiatric discourse, inasmuch as these actors believe that they have all 
the important elements of psychiatry in one book. To face the threat to their independence, 
psychiatrists perform many strategies in practice denominated by the author as 
"workarounds”, as follows: they use their own taxonomies and then translate them into DSM 
terms, use only a few categories instead of  the hundreds of options given by DSM, focus less 
on the diagnosis and more on the treatment, do not always record the diagnosis in clinical 
records, avoid diagnosis that may lead to social stigmatization, record severe diagnosis to 
assure that the insurance companies pay for the treatments and use vague diagnosis such as 
“not otherwise specified” categories for skipping interferences. 
Now, after the work of Bowker and Star, other STS scholars have contributed to the 
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understanding of standards. Among these scholars are Timmermans and Berg (2003). Taking 
as a base the Actor Network Theory, these scholars argue that standards include the 
interception of multiple points of view, involve the participation of many human and 
nonhuman actors, and reorder practices.   
As well, Star and Lampland (2009) have identified a list of commonalities shared by 
standards: 1) nested, new standards grow from the already existing standards; 2) distributed 
unevenly, standards do not affect all groups in the same way, some are excluded while others 
benefit; 3) relative to the users and the community of practice, standards have different impact 
and meaning depending on the context; 4) integrated, standards are articulated with other 
standards, and 5) embody ethics and values; standards establish the practices accepted as 
good in society. 
Finally, Busch (2011) argues that although standards may look “neutral, benign, merely 
technical, obscure, and removed from daily life” (p. 28), they are related with power since 
they set down the categories from which others have to choose. 
1.3 Psychiatric standardized classifications as sociotechnical 
objects: the cases of the DSM and the ICD  
Psychiatric standardized classifications are widespread devices that work as referents across 
many countries to diagnose mental disorders. The most recognized and used devices that 
have accomplished this goal are the International Statistical Classification of Diseases (ICD) 
and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).  
On the one hand, the ICD is an international classification designed by the World Health 
Organization to classify statistically significant diseases in different countries with the aim of 
identifying the levels of morbidity and mortality around the world. This is not precisely a 
psychiatric classification but a health classification that includes mental disorders; however, 
like many countries, Colombia has agreed to use the ICD-10 (tenth edition) to record the 
diagnoses of the whole health system, including the mental health services (Ministerio de 
Salud, 2001). On the other hand, the DSM is a psychiatric classification designed by the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA) and it probably is the most heavily used psychiatric 
classification worldwide.  
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In the present thesis, these psychiatric classifications are understood as sociotechnical 
objects; it means that they are constructed in practices in which social phenomena and 
technical elements converge. To sustain this statement, I am going to discuss two case studies. 
In the first case, the influence of social groups in the DSM’s design is discussed (Kutchins and 
Kirk, 1997). In the second case, it is argued that the ICD is a situated device, a product of the 
interaction of many social and technological actors (Bowker and Star, 1999). 
1.3.1 The declassification of homosexuality in the DSM  
Kutchins and Kirk (1997) have studied how DSM categories have been linked to the social and 
political work of many groups; for example, the influence of Vietnam veterans in the inclusion 
of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder or the mobilization of feminist groups to defeat the 
category of Masochistic Personality Disorder. As an example of this approach, I am going to 
discuss the role of US (United States) gay activism in the declassification of homosexuality as a 
mental disorder. 
In the fifties and the sixties homosexual groups became more organized and changed their 
own vision from homosexuals to groups with a specific life style called “gays”. Meanwhile, in 
1968 the DSM-II was published and included the following category: 
302 Sexual deviations. This category is for individuals whose sexual interests are directed 
primarily towards objects other than people of the opposite sex, toward sexual acts not usually 
associated with coitus, or toward coitus performed under bizarre circumstances as in 
necrophilia, pedophilia, sexual sadism and fetishism. Even though many find their practices 
distasteful, they remain unable to substitute normal sexual behavior for them. This diagnosis is 
not appropriate for individuals who perform deviant sexual acts because normal sexual objects 
are not available to them (DSM II, 44, quoted in Kutchins and Kirk, 1997, 57). 
In this definition it is clear that normal sexual behavior can only be directed to persons from 
the opposite sex; therefore, in this category homosexuality was a deviation among others 
such as pedophilia, sexual sadism and fetishism. As a reaction, gay groups demanded that the 
APA include gay supporter speakers in their congresses.  
In the meantime psychiatry had its own debates. In the fifties and the sixties psychoanalysis 
was the predominant force in US psychiatry; in this fashion, DSM-I and II (I and II represent 
the first and the second edition) were constructed with a psychoanalytic orientation. 
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However, in the seventies, this started to change thanks to the growing force of psychiatrists 
interested in psychiatric classifications.  
In this context, many psychoanalytically oriented psychiatrists considered homosexuality as 
the result of a cold father and an overprotective mother. Gay groups did not agree with this as 
they were against looking for etiological causes of something that was not a ‘disorder’. The 
psychiatrists interested in classifications saw this as an opportunity to reduce the 
psychoanalytical public force and allied themselves with representatives of gay groups. Then, 
psychiatrists interested in psychiatric classifications and gay activists started to work 
together to declassify homosexuality from the DSM by critiquing psychoanalysis. However, 
the interests of both groups were not the same; while gay groups wanted to exclude 
completely the category from the DSM, the psychiatrists interested in classifications had won 
predominance in the design of the DSM-III (third edition) but did not dispense with the 
category; instead they only modified it. The new category was as follows:  
302.00 Ego Dystonic Homosexuality The essential features are a desire to acquire or 
increase heterosexual arousal, so that heterosexual relationship can be initiated or 
maintained, and a sustained pattern of overt homosexual arousal that the individual 
explicitly states has been unwanted and a persistent source of distress. 
This category is reserved for those homosexuals for whom changing sexual orientations 
is a persistent concern (DSM-III, 282, quoted in Kutchins and Kirk, 1997, 86). 
To entirely exclude homosexuality as a disorder was not necessary for the psychiatrists 
involved in the change. In this definition, not all homosexuality was a disorder; it was only a 
disorder when the homosexual was strongly against their own sexual orientation. 
Gay groups were not entirely satisfied with this category and continued their work until 
finally in the DSM-IV (fourth edition) the category was dismissed. Nonetheless, there are 
some traces that remain as it can be seen in the following DSM-IV category:   
302.9 Sexual Disorder Not Otherwise Specified This category is included for coding a sexual 
disturbance that does not meet the criteria for any specific Sexual Disorder and is neither a 
Sexual Dysfunction nor a Paraphilia, examples include… (3) Persistent and marked distress 
about sexual orientation (DSM IV, 538, quoted in Kutchins and Kirk, 1997, 91).  
Even though the word homosexuality disappeared and the category lost hierarchical 
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importance passing from a specific category to a “Not Otherwise Specified” category, this 
“persistent and marked distress about sexual orientation” is similar to the description of the 
DSM-III Ego Dystonic Homosexuality. 
1.3.2 ICD: Silenced social narratives, communication infrastructures and 
multiple actors 
Bowker and Star (1999) have analyzed the ICD from three perspectives: As a technical device 
with silenced social narratives, as a tool that works thanks to information infrastructures and 
as an object for the coordination of practices.  
ICD silenced social narratives  
The ICD is a text mainly constituted by names of diseases and codes. However, even if it may 
seem highly technical, it includes silenced social narratives that can be made explicit by 
reading it contextually (Bowker and Star, 1999). An example of these narratives can be 
pointed out in the ICD-9 (ninth edition) category of accidents which includes the following 
list: 
E884 Other fall from one level to another 
E884.0 Fall from playground equipment 
   Excludes: Recreational machinery (E919.8) 
E884.1  Fall from cliff 
E884.2 Fall from chair 
E884.3 Fall from wheelchair 
E884.4 Fall from bed 
E884.5 Fall from other furniture 
E884.6 Fall from commode 
   Toilet 
E884.9 Other fall from one level to another 
   Fall from:  Fall from:    
   embankment  stationary vehicle 
   haystack  tree 
(ICD-9, 289, quoted in Bowker and Star, 1999, 76) 
According to Bowker and Star, this category gives an account of the emphasis that the ICD-9 
puts on some contexts over others; in this case, the list about falls is more relevant for 
industrial societies than for nomadic tribes (except for the falls from a cliff and a tree).  
Information infrastructures and the ICD 
Bowker and Star (1999) argue that ICD’s history cannot be understood without taking into 
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account its links with the history of information infrastructures. For example, in the late 
nineteenth century large bureaucracies started to feel the need to share information in 
response to the growth of infrastructures such as insurance companies, railroads and post 
offices. To attend to this need, a system of punched cards that permitted the speedy counting 
of people was designed. These punched cards made ICD’s statistical elaboration much easier; 
nevertheless, the materials were expensive and few countries decided to implement them. 
Later, with the developing of computerized systems in the twentieth century, it was possible 
to store more information at a lower cost and many other countries decided to adopt the ICD 
for their health systems. 
The ICD as a tool for the coordination of information  
The ICD has been designed to coordinate information among many actors such as: “public 
health offices, hospitals, insurance companies, health accountancy firms, and bureaus of vital 
statistics throughout the world” (Bowker and Star, 1999, 136). According to Bowker and Star 
(1999) this coordination has been difficult for the following reasons: 
 International conflicts: Each country produces information at its own pace with 
different levels of quality, each one has different bureaucratic structures and 
emphasizes the record of different diseases, the national schools differ in the way of 
recording clinical data, some developing countries understand the ICD as a tool of 
colonialism and for some countries recording diseases or causes of dying is not among 
their priorities. An example given by the authors is the case of Indonesia: In this 
country infant deaths by malnutrition are endemic and for them it is more important 
to prevent this problem than collecting detailed statistics of different diseases. 
 Conflicting needs between doctors and statisticians: Each of these actors may have 
different agendas; for example in the case of death certificates, doctors may argue that 
they do not want to spend time filling records when there are so many patients alive 
who need them while statisticians may want as much information as possible to 
establish significant differences in the variables that may cause deaths in large 
proportions of the population. 
 Industrial actors with heterogeneous goals: a) Insurance companies aim to have 
statistics that help them to organize the cost of their polices, b) Industrial firms such as 
chemical companies need statistics that relate deaths to exposures to certain 
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substances and, c) Pharmaceutical companies look for statistics about the organism’s 
response to certain drugs. 
This list of actors with such different interests has led Bowker and Star to conclude that the 
ICD is more than a list of diseases, it is a wide set of compromises allowing cooperation in 
complex contexts. 
Now, both cases are good examples of how the social and the technical are inseparable in the 
construction of psychiatric standardized classifications. In the case of the DSM, the interaction 
between social groups and the DSM’s designers; in the case of the ICD, how the current state 
of society, the informational infrastructures and the interests of different actors are 
interdependent in its construction.  
Finally, these cases illustrate the arguments made by STS scholars about standards since they 
show the practical politics involved in their construction, the relationship with multiple actors 
and the connotation that standards have for different communities.  
1.4 Methods and the construction of reality 
In a huge amount of methodology books, you will find the indication that methods are means 
to know reality; in this sense, you must choose the method that works better to understand 
the reality that you attempt to know.  However, STS scholars (Latour and Woolgar, 1995; Law, 
2004; Mol, 2002) propose the opposite: our methods help us construct reality. Let us see two 
cases that help them sustain this thesis.  
The first case is Latour and Woolgar’s Laboratory Life (1995). In an ethnography inside a 
laboratory, these scholars pointed out that there are lots of transformations from the initial 
materials to the final published scientific papers; to explain these transformations Latour and 
Woolgar proposed the notion of inscription device: inscription devices are any apparatus used 
to transform material substances into ‘paper forms’; for example: 
An inscription device might start out with rats. These would be sacrificed to produce extracts 
which would be placed in small test tubes. Then those test tubes would be placed in a machine, 
for instance a radiation detector, which would convert them into an array of figures or 
inscriptions on a sheet of paper (Law, 2004, 20). 
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According to Latour and Woolgar, these transformations will be made invisible in the final 
report in which it is assumed that the organic material of the rat is totally equivalent to the 
traces on the sheets of paper; nevertheless, the inscription cannot exist without the apparatus 
that allowed the change from material to symbolic traces, in other words, the data is 
constructed thanks to the test tubes and the radiation detector. 
The second case is The Body Multiple (Mol, 2002). In her praxiography3, Mol claims that 
different practices enact different objects4. To illustrate this point, Let us discuss a fragment of 
her field diary: 
The doctor looks in the file in front of him and takes a letter out. "So, Mrs. Tilstra, here your 
general practitioner writes you've got problems with your leg. Do you?" "Yes, yes, doctor. That's 
why I come here." "Tell me, then, what are those problems? When do you have them?" "Well, 
what can I say? It's when I try to do something doctor, move, walk, whatever. Like, I used to 
walk the dog for long stretches, but now I can't. I hardly can. It hurts too much." "Where does it 
hurt?" "Here, doctor, mostly down here, in my calf it does. In my left leg." "So it hurts in your left 
calf when you walk. Now how many meters, if you walk on flat ground, say, how many meters do 
you think you can walk before it starts hurting?" "What can I say? I think it must be, well, some, 
not a lot, some fifty meters I guess." "Good. Or not good. Well. And then, can you walk again, 
then, after some rest?" "Yeah, if I wait for a while, after that, yes. I can, yes. (Mol, 2002, 21-22) 
About this scene, Mol argues that before entering in the consultant room, something was 
going on with Mrs. Tilstra, she had pain from walking and was not able to go out with her dog 
as she used to; however, this pain was unspecific and linked to her performance in everyday 
experience. Once she entered the consulting room and started being questioned by the 
surgeon, this experience was re-shaped; besides being pain from waking the dog, it was pain 
in a specific part of her body related to a specific walking distance measured in meters that 
got better with moments of rest; also, these sensations acquired the name of “Intermittent 
Claudication”. 
Mol concludes that to achieve classifying Mrs. Tilstra’s condition as intermittent claudication, 
the encounter of two actors in a specific context is needed: the patient and the surgeon. 
                                                          
3 This is a method to observe sociomaterial practices; for example, in her observation of the practices inside a 
clinic, Mol (2002) did not only observe people but also the interaction of buildings, knives, dyes, desks, clinical 
records, diagnostic apparatus, among many other actors. 
4 Mol uses the verb ‘to enact’ to describe how objects are handled in practice.  
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Without the patient, it is only possible to enact explanations about the condition, without the 
surgeon, and the whole medical setting, it is only a diffuse pain caused by walking.  
Now, in both cases methods are constructing realities. In the case of Latour and Woolgar 
(1995), the concept of inscription device is an example of how the objects are reshaped by 
technical apparatus that transform the organic material into symbolic traces. In the case of 
Mol (2002), diseases are being enacted in the interaction of patients, surgeons, physical 
exams, clinical records and many other actors.  
Something similar will happen in chapter two, there is a psychiatry program in which 
standardized classifications are used to diagnose patients; still, before I constructed this 
thesis, there was not anything like thought collectives, sociotechnical lessons, tacit and explicit 
knowledge or practical politics. Furthermore, STS literature is not only telling me how I must 
understand the training practices, but what to observe; for example, I will pay attention to 
how residents learn by impersonal means such as written documents and by personal means 
such as the guidance of the master or learning by doing. 
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2. Eight sociotechnical lessons about psychiatric 
standards that residents must learn 
The second chapter addresses an ethnography inside a psychiatric training program. The goal 
of the ethnography was to observe the sociotechnical lessons that the students of this 
program experienced during their training in regard to psychiatric standardized 
classifications. Following Prentice (2007), I have chosen the term “sociotechnical” to point out 
that scientific training is at the same time social and technical. Likewise, I claim that 
psychiatry residents “must learn” these lessons because they are linked to the core values of 
the field. The lessons are discussed in three moments: 
In the first moment it is discussed how I was able to construct the present thesis assembling 
heterogeneous elements such as: a postgraduate psychiatric training program, STS categories 
and specific observational practices.  
In the second moment the actual sociotechnical lessons are described; they are classified in 
two groups: The first group addresses the lessons experienced in the clinic; in this practice, 
the students are taught to distrust the standards. The second group tackles the lessons in the 
academic meetings; in this activity, the students are required to use the standardized 
classifications but with many precautions.   
In the third moment, the case is discussed around STS categories. Specifically it explains: a) 
why an outsider cannot understand standards in the way that the members of the psychiatric 
collective can, b) how the concepts of tacit and explicit knowledge contribute in the 
understanding of the psychiatrists’ learning process, c) the ways in which the construction of 
standards varies even inside the same psychiatric program, d) how the introduction of a new 
standard reorders the psychiatric practices, e) the ways in which the psychiatrists construct 
the standards’ history as a cumulative progression and, f) the positions that psychiatrists take 
towards the authority of the standards that come from the North (the European and North 
American standards) and the South (the South American standard). Finally, the duality 
between the standards’ practical force and the users’ resistance is addressed. 
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2.1 Observing practices or constructing realities: Constructing the 
sociotechnical lessons about psychiatric standardized 
classifications 
STS scholars (Latour and Woolgar, 1995; Law, 2004; Mol, 2002) have argued that reality is 
not out there ready to be known; instead, if you want to enact a reality, you will need to work 
it out with different sociotechnical practices. This is not different in the present thesis in 
which I have assembled elements such as a psychiatric training program, STS conceptual 
categories and specific observational practices to produce an account called: Eight 
sociotechnical lessons about psychiatric standards that residents must learn. In the following 
pages it is described how I worked out these elements. 
2.1.1 Being a psychologist or being an ethnographer: the experience of a 
hybrid observational position   
The psychiatric training program that I observed during 2012 and 2013 is situated in a middle 
sized town in Colombia which is also my hometown. It initiated in 2008 and it is one of the 
newest programs in the country that offers postgraduate training in psychiatry. As happens 
with other medical specialties, the students of this program are called “residents”; this 
expression suggests that those who enroll in the program are more than people who attend 
classes, instead they have to “reside” in the program. This can be noted in the fact that this 
residency lasts three years and it is of exclusive dedication, it means that the residents have to 
be entirely focused in the residency and are not allowed to be employed or carry out any 
other academic activities during their studies. In these three years, residents attend many 
seminars, courses, case studies, topic reviews and rotations. In my ethnography, I observed 
most of these practices. 
As an observer of this program, I have been on the edge between being an insider and an 
outsider; I may consider myself an insider for two reasons. The first reason is that my 
graduate formation was in psychology and in this training I acquired some specific ideas 
about psychiatric standardized classifications. The second reason is that, since its foundation, 
I have being close to the program in different ways. In contrast, I consider myself an outsider 
who is able to construct an account different from the reality of the natives thanks to my STS 
training. 
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In regard to the first reason for being an insider, maybe it is not entirely accurate to say that 
psychology made me an insider; but it encouraged me to construct negative ideas of the 
psychiatric standardized classifications. Historically psychologists have had an ambivalent 
relationship with psychiatry: on the one side, there are psychologists who value psychiatry 
and are able to work with psychiatrists without problems, on the other side, there are 
psychologists who are skeptical in regard to psychiatric practice or do not agree with 
psychiatric intervention; I was trained in the second group, especially I was doubtful about 
those psychiatrists who relied on the DSM-IV.  
I spent most of my psychological training studying lacanian psychoanalysis, a psychoanalytic 
orientation that follows the teachings of French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. By reading 
some of the scholars from this orientation, I learned that the DSM-IV was harmful for patients 
and clinicians. For patients because it blurred their particularity by classifying them into 
general categories, for clinicians because it blurred the art of diagnosing by giving them step 
by step methods of diagnosis.  
The second reason why I may consider myself an insider is stronger. Since its foundation, I 
have been attached to the program in one way or the other. Before entering the STS master, I 
took some courses and attended some symposia organized by the program. But, after I began 
the master, my relationship with the program grew even closer: It began with a research in 
which I worked with some psychiatrists and residents, then I was employed as a psychologist 
at the clinic where the residents performed most of their rotations, and recently, I started 
teaching some courses in the program. 
My closeness to the program affected the way in which I was treated in my field work. Before 
starting my observation, I explained my project presenting myself as an STS student who was 
going to perform an ethnography about the training practices for the use of psychiatric 
standardized classifications. However, this presentation was not entirely effective because for 
them, I kept being only a psychologist; here are two examples:  
Example 1: During my ethnography, there was a psychology student in the clinic. Sometimes 
after rounds, I discussed with one of the psychiatrists what happened in regard to the 
psychiatric training and although I told him that I did not have an evaluative goal, he always 
asked me about how I evaluated the performance of this psychology student. In this case, I 
was a psychologist who was there to evaluate another psychologist. 
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Example 2: A psychiatrist was explaining to the residents how to apply some scales and he 
told me the following: I hope that what we are seeing is helping you with your research and as a 
psychologist; if you want I can train you in these scales. I answered that I was leaning a lot, but I 
preferred to be focused on my observation as a sociologist of knowledge. A few months later, I 
was in the selecting process to work in the clinic as a psychologist and one of the selectors 
was this professor; he was very concerned about working with me because according to him, 
the last time I had not shown any interest in his work; I explained to him again that back then 
I had a different role and the problem was solved. In this situation, I was a psychologist who 
was not interested in the psychiatrist’s work. 
Apart from the last example where my dual role put my work in danger, being a psychologist 
helped me a lot. Saying that I was a psychologist was much easier in comparison to saying 
that I was an STS master student who was performing an ethnography of the training 
practices to use the standardized classifications. Beyond the difference between the numbers 
of words, it was easier to explain my role in the clinic because the presence of a psychologist 
was more understandable that the observation of an STS scholar; for example, residents 
introduced me to patients as a psychologist who was going to help them and patients never 
asked anything else.     
Otherwise, I consider myself an outsider because of my STS training. An example of the 
influence of this training is how it helped me reshape my previous ideas and construct the 
present thesis; it was as follows: At the beginning of my STS master, I was concerned with the 
predominance of pharmacotherapy over psychotherapy in mental health intervention; in 
other words, I was troubled about why the health system preferred psychiatric medication 
over psychological psychotherapy. In this sense, my initial problem was a campaign for the 
vindication of psychology since my plan was to unveil the ideologies and misbalances of 
power that were causing the preference for psychiatric medications.  
Later during my STS training, by reading scholars such as Kuhn (2000), Fleck (1986), Bloor 
(1998) and Pinch (1993), I learned that there is no such thing as a reality ready to be 
unveiled; instead, there are social groups that construct different realities according to their 
practices. In this order of ideas, the reality of one group may be in conflict with the reality of 
another and these contradictions may lead to scientific controversies. In these controversies, 
each side claims to act according to facts and reproaches the other for being inaccurate, 
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methodologically wrong and for being influenced by social factors. These reflections made me 
realize that in psychology I was trained in a thought collective in which the DSM-IV was 
considered bad, nevertheless, there are other groups that value it as a good device. Then, the 
goodness or badness of an object depends on the practices of different social groups and their 
commitment to specific forms of reality.  
Now, for some researchers this commentary on my dual observational position may seem a 
methodological outburst; nevertheless, the reflections of this section have helped me in two 
ways: 1) to point out that psychiatrists never stopped seeing me as psychologist and this 
affected their behavior in front of me and; 2) to give you an idea of how my own STS training 
helped me rework my previous ideas about the psychiatric standardized classifications.   
2.1.2 Shaping practices: Using my own inscription devices  
According to Mol (2002) objects are not just ideal categories that are known by cognitive 
efforts; instead, they are done – enacted - in sociomaterial practices. Mol’s argument works to 
understand the present thesis in which I carried my own sociomaterial practices. To illustrate 
these practices, I am going to use the concept of inscription device (Latour and Woolgar, 
1995). Latour and Woolgar argue that the inscription devices are any apparatus that 
transform material objects into symbolic traces; in the present thesis something similar 
happened, I used many devices to transform my observation into the account that you are 
reading right now. 
The following transformations cannot be understood as a straitjacket; they have been 
numbered to give a sense of order but many happened simultaneously, in the opposite 
direction, or with skipped steps. 
Transformation 1: Introducing an odd actor  
Let us start with a fragment of my field diary: 
Here I am, someone who sits behind a video camera for hours taking notes; it does not quite fit, I 
am not performing any of the common practices in the clinic such as talking with patients, filling 
clinical records, distributing medications, cooking or cleaning rooms.  
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Often during my observation, I carried a video camera, a tripod and a notebook. The first 
thing to note about my presence as a hybrid actant (using Latour’s terminology), half human 
half observational technologies, is that I filled a physical space; in this case, I occupied more 
volume than usual because of the tripod (see Picture 1). This spatiality was more obvious 
when I had to position myself in narrow halls to observe the residents; in these moments, I 
was clearly interfering with the free traffic of the clinical staff that had to be acrobatic to 
avoid me. 
Another aspect in which my presence 
affected the usual practices of the clinic 
was in the sense of anonymity. I will give 
you an example: The first day of my 
ethnography, the medical director 
introduced me in front of the clinical staff 
as a psychologist who was studying a 
master in “Social Sciences or something 
similar” at the National University who 
would be in their activities henceforth; 
after that, he asked me briefly to present 
my project.  This introduction continued 
for some time whenever there was 
someone new in the clinical staff.  
  
Picture 1: Me in the clinic 
Progressively this introduction lost some elements, first I was not asked to explain the project 
anymore; then, the name of the university disappeared and; even the psychologist and master 
in “Social Sciences” was not mentioned again. One day the introduction went like this: This is 
doctor Bejarano, a second year resident, this is doctor Gabriela, a psychologist; this is doctor 
Blanco, resident three, R3; Marcela, nursing student; the chief nurse; Peter, R2 of psychiatry 
and…It was my turn…a duck that we have here. Everybody laughed and the chief nurse added 
that I was a spy. 
In this region, a duck is similar to the English expression “a third wheel”, someone who is in a 
place where he does not belong. On the one hand, the simplification of my introduction speaks 
about the habituation of the group to me and my camera; on the other hand, Freud (1991) has 
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taught us about how jokes work to make serious points without serious consequences. In this 
case, being a spy is talking about the discomfort that I have generated with my observation 
because they felt evaluated. 
During my observation, I was never told to turn off the camera, but many times I was asked to 
be very careful with information. After a few months, some participants manifested to me that 
they had forgotten about me and performed their activities in a relaxed manner; nevertheless, 
we will never know how they would have behaved if I had not decided to carry out my 
ethnography. 
Transformation 2: The possibilities of observation  
Another fragment:  
Although my video camera and my notebook helped me a lot in the ethnography, sometimes I 
felt that I was losing information; for example, when there was a person speaking and suddenly 
someone else spoke, I focused on turning the camera and not on what was going on. Similarly, 
while I was writing something in my notebook, other things were taking place and I was 
missing them.  
Selecting what practices to attend, turning on the camera at one moment and not another, 
zooming in on specific practices, taking some notes and not others, these were not simple 
decisions; moreover, they were the product of my STS socialization that is training me to pay 
attention to some things and to leave others aside. Simultaneously, these sorts of decision 
worked together with the possibilities and limitations of my observational technologies; for 
example, my video camera was only able to record some parts of a situation and not the whole 
experience.  
Transformation 3: From tridimensional experiences to two-dimensional traces   
The experience of the practice is not exactly the same as its posterior representation. The step 
from a tridimensional experience that only happens once to written descriptions and two-
dimensional representations that can be consulted many times produces its own changes 
(Ashmore and Reed, 2000). For example, initially we had sensations of heat and cold, smells, 
people doing facial expressions simultaneously and tridimensional experiences; then this was 
replaced by two-dimensional video records, tapes, pictures and written notes.  
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Transformation 4: From two-dimensional traces to codes 
Once I had a good number of two-dimensional traces, a new selection began: to decide what 
information was valuable for my goals This selection required the interaction of three 
elements: The judgment to identify what counted as relevant (acquired by socialization), the 
two dimensional traces (videos and written notes) and the procedures to divide the relevant 
from the irrelevant (Atlas ti). To organize this information, I used the software Atlas.ti 6.2; this 
program allows the user to link different sources such as videos, pictures, PDF documents and 
Word documents in a virtual environment that allows selecting, organizing and comparing 
large amounts of information.   
What I did to relate my notebook with this program was to transcribe the portions that I 
evaluated as relevant. In this process, I only included symbolic descriptions and not the 
drawings and schemes that I had drawn on the physical paper.  
Relating my videos with the Atlas ti demanded an extra step. My video camera produces 
videos in MOV format, however the Atlas ti 6.2 is only able to link videos in WMV format; I do 
not know what these formats mean, but I had to find software that converted the videos to an 
appropriate format; without this sort of software, it would not have been possible to use the 
Atlas ti that made my analytic work easier. 
The Atlas ti has a lot of useful functions, my aim is not to list all of them here; nevertheless, 
Picture 2 will help me tell you about the kind of work that I was able to do with this software. 
In the image, I have pointed out five elements; Let us see those in detail: 
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Picture 2: Atlas ti screenshot    
 List of memos: It contains several analytic notes and each of these notes received a 
name to identify its topic easily; for example, the first memo of the list is “adjetivos y 
comparaciones para el DSM-IV usadas por PSIQ2” (adjectives and comparisons used 
by PSIQ2 for the DSM-IV). In this case, PSIQ2 is one of the professors of the program 
and if you open the memo, expressions such as that the DSM-IV is “mechanistic” and 
“reductionist” will appear. In the memos I also transcribed relevant parts of my 
notebook. 
 Video: This is the kind of traces produced by the video camera; I named each video 
with the place and the time in which it was recoded. The video on the image was 
recorded in the balcony of the clinic on February 9 of 2012.  
 Time of the video: It is a bar that represents the duration of the video, inside this bar, I 
was able to select the fragments that I considered relevant; the Atlas ti denominates 
these fragments as quotations. Later, if it was my wish, I could refer myself directly to 
the quotation without watching the whole video again. The quotation in the image 
received the same name as the video.  
 List of quotations: In this chart we can see the list of quotations. By working with 
quotations, I linked several quotations into codes. Codes are labels that represent 
patterns or representative situations that I found in my observation. The code related 
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to the quotation in the image is “Chiste de R3jj sobre que R2M se ubique en un eje del 
DSM-IV” (Joke of R3jj about R2M being classified in an axis of the DSM-IV).  
Respectively, “R2” and “R3” represent residents of second and third year and the 
letters “jj” and “M” are hints that helped me remember who was involved in the 
interaction.  
 Space for notes: For every quotation you can add a comment, each time that you open 
a specific quotation the comment will appear.    
As you can tell, dear reader, this program helped me transform the two-dimensional traces in 
quotations or memos that later were grouped into codes. The codes are a step away from the 
analytic fragments because they are conglomerates of quotations that only include words and 
not images. As happened with the link between the video and the quotations, if it was my 
wish, I was able to go directly to the codes without checking again the whole quotation.        
Transformation 5: From codes to networks 
The next step in the analysis was grouping the codes into categories; this was done thanks to 
the Atlas ti function of networks. Networks are conceptual maps that allow you to represent 
graphically the relationships among codes. In Picture 3, we can see a network that represents 
the category “El DSM y el CIE-10 son solo para fines formales” (The DSM and the ICD are just 
for formal ends) that is supported by four codes.   
 
 
Picture 3: Network screenshot 
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Transformation 6: From networks to a written document 
Networks were a very useful function to represent graphically the main ideas of my thesis; 
still they were not the same as a written text. In my experience, it has been hard to construct 
a coherent narrative based only in networks because visual relationships are not always 
transportable to words; therefore these relationships needed to be reshaped again. In 
addition,  until this point, I worked in Spanish because it is my first language and the language 
of the observed psychiatrists, so in the process of translation, the material was changed 
again; we saw the example of the word “duck” that in certain contexts is similar to the 
expression of “a third wheel”. Finally, the text was fed by the comments of my advisor and the 
evaluators, a process that implied other transformations. 
Transformation 7: From a written document to an active reader 
Taking into account the concept of interpretative flexibility (Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, 1990), 
the transformations of this thesis did not end with the written document because with every 
new reading it changes. According to Bijker et al., the interpretation of any technology 
depends on the socialization of each user. In this sense, you are not a passive receptacle who 
adopts my ideas; instead you are constantly transforming what you are reading with your 
own construction of reality. Furthermore, this thesis cannot come into being without you, 
dear reader; texts without readers are just meaningless traces. 
Now, with these transformations we can tell how the initial practices were not the same as 
the final products; it happened as follows: First, there was a psychiatric program with its own 
struggles and objectives in which an odd actant who observed for hours with a video camera 
and a notebook was introduced. After this observation, the obtained traces were constantly 
transformed: They passed from being two dimensional traces to quotations, from quotations 
to codes, from codes to networks, and from networks to a written document. And finally, 
there is your interpretation that is giving this thesis a new sense.  
To claim that the initial practices are not the same as the subsequent products does not imply 
that they are totally different; after all, I am talking about psychiatrists learning certain 
practices in a specific context; nevertheless, the statements that I am writing here, were not 
possible without all my prior work; paraphrasing Law (2004), my method helped me 
construct a particular reality. 
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Finally, the present text is an example of how realities are enacted in sociomaterial practices 
since I had to make social practices and material objects work together to produce an STS 
thesis; for example: software, a video camera, a notebook, a tripod, STS categories, 
interaction with psychiatrists and residents, my advisor’s suggestions and linguistic 
translations.  
2.2 Eight sociotechnical lessons about psychiatric standardized 
classifications 
Prentice (2007) has claimed that in scientific training even the more technical lessons are 
attached to social meanings; it is the case of the psychiatry program that I am studying in 
which, through different tasks, comments, sanctions and indications, psychiatric residents 
learn the practices that their thought collective values in regard to the use of the 
standardized classifications (Fleck, 1986). 
In this psychiatry program the lessons vary according to the contexts, in particular there are 
two contexts that implement different kinds of lessons. The first context is the clinic, a 
location in which the residents are constantly coached by the professors about not using the 
DSM-IV because it leads them to mistakes. The second context is the academic meetings I 
which the use of the standardized classifications is required, but their limitations are always 
discussed and the professors are always warning the residents to be careful with their use.  
2.2.1 Lessons in the clinic  
Psychiatric residents spent most of their time in clinics; I observed them in the clinic where 
they carry out most of their practices. In this clinic, residents receive daily supervision from 
two professors that, thanks to the constant interaction, are the psychiatrists that influence 
their training in the greatest degree. The following three lessons will include the interaction 
of Erick and Gustav, both psychiatrists of the clinic, and two second year residents named 
Julio and Albert. 
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2.2.2 Lesson 1: Do not use telephones for psychiatric interviews: DSM-IV, 
psychiatric anti-values and the way in which “gringos”5 do things 
This lesson took place during rounds. Rounds are probably the most important space of 
socialization in the whole psychiatry program, since the residents receive daily feedback 
from their professors about how to understand cases, how to relate to patients and the 
contextual possibilities of intervention. 
In the rounds the clinical staff meets to discuss the health state of each patient. The staff is led 
by the medical director (who is a psychiatrist) and it is composed by students and 
professionals of psychiatry, psychology, nursing, occupational therapy and social work (See 
Picture 4). 
  
During rounds, psychiatry residents are asked to present case studies; the following situation 
happened in one of these presentations:   
Albert is helping Julio (both second year residents) prepare a case presentation, they are looking 
in the DSM-IV Breviary6 for a diagnosis; they find what they were looking for. Later, Julio presents 
the case in front of the clinical staff; he presents the patient’s history, the mental exam, the family 
                                                          
5 In this lesson you are going to find two related words: “gringos” and “gringal”. “Gringo” is any person who was 
born in the United States and “gringal” is the way in which “gringos” do things. Both words are derogative because 
they came from the expression “green go”, the rejection of the people who came from United States with “green” 
dollars.  
6 DSM-IV short version which only includes lists of symptoms for the diagnoses  
Picture 4: During 
rounds. From left 
to right: a third 
year resident, two 
nurse assistants, a 
psychology 
student and on 
the desk the 
medical director. 
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dynamics… Erick (psychiatrist) asks if the information about the family was obtained by a 
personal interview or by phone, Julio answers that it was by phone. Erick gets very angry and says: 
“If you are going to present me the DSM-IV this is silliness, there is no case, you need to get over 
this excessive concrete thinking, so mechanistic. Is a person depressed? It can even be said by the 
doorman. We need to transcend the DSM-IV and the ICD-10 criteria, this is not about a set of 
symptoms, this is about patients’ experience; we need to come back to Jaspers’ phenomenology. Do 
not mess with the DSM-IV, do not limit yourself to lists of symptoms; this psychiatric nosology is 
leading us nowhere, you keep reciting things, but you do not understand the patient”. Finally, 
Erick stops the presentation and says that the case needed to be repeated. 
The next week Julio starts: “This is the case that was left, last week we saw how not to approach a 
psychiatric patient, today is…” there are laughs and Julio continues “how it must be”. After the 
exposition, Julio says that last week he made a mistake because he was superficial, did not 
understand the patient as a whole and did not pay attention to what was really happening.  
Erick answers “You see the difference when you interview by phone, do not fall into the “gringal” 
mechanical ways, that is what “gringos” do”. Erick adds two anecdotes to prove his point. The first 
anecdote: “Yesterday I was astonished because a friend of mine brought his son to my private 
practice; they live in NY and over there the son was diagnosed with schizophrenia; then, I asked 
him: who was your psychiatrist? The father said “no, it was all by phone”, I said “how come?” “I am 
interviewed by phone, they send me the prescription by internet, I print the prescription and I go 
to the pharmacy”. This is the new mode of primary intervention in the United Sates to treat 
schizophrenics. When I interviewed the son, he had not taken any medication and he had a 
tantrum, nothing to do with schizophrenia, but they had made the diagnosis by phone”. Second 
anecdote “There is a Peruvian physician named Argos, he is very famous in the United States, he is 
a child psychiatrist, but he has never seen a kid; he is the leader in child’s treatment by internet, he 
does therapy, diagnosis and interviews from his house all day and charges 300 dollars per half an 
hour”. Finally Erick concludes “I am not against technology, but for many human issues you need 
to have the patient over there; who can tell me that who I am treating is the patient or a 
simulation?”      
This situation is interesting for the public castigation that Julio received. In this case, the 
resident is socially disciplined with repeating a case presentation due to the professor 
considering that his approach was not the right one. Still, this lesson is not only for Julio, it is 
also for all the residents who attended this presentation; it is something like this: “If you 
perform this sort of presentation, you will be publically corrected and you will have to repeat 
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your cases”.  But, what is lacking in the resident’s approach? What are the lessons to learn 
here? This lesson has three components:       
Do not use telephones for psychiatric interviews 
This is the most technical lesson; it implies not using telephones for psychiatric interviews 
because it leads the residents to misdiagnose and give wrong treatments. Also, Erick argues 
that there are many human issues that require physical presence and they can even have a 
hard time identifying if the person on the other end of the line is a simulation or a real 
patient.     
It is the kind of mistakes that you made by using the DSM-IV 
By no means is the issue about the use of telephones in psychiatric interviews the most 
important component of this lesson; instead, this is an opportunity that Erick takes to 
address the values and the anti-values in psychiatry. For this psychiatrist, the ICD, and 
especially the DSM-IV, embody the psychiatric anti-values; it can be noted in the statements 
about the case in the first presentation. Let us analyze in detail the work that each of these 
statements is able to make:   
 The word “silliness” is telling the resident that those who use the DSM-IV are fools 
 “There is no case” means that to construct a case based on the DSM-IV is inadequate 
 With “concrete thinking” he is implying that those who use the DSM-IV are not able to 
perform abstractions.  
 The expressions “mechanistic”, “do not limit yourself to lists of symptoms” and “you 
keep reciting things, but you do not understand the patient” are saying that the DSM-IV 
is leading them to rigidity and a lack of reflectiveness.  
 The inclusion of the “doorman” is a negative allusion. In this context, the psychiatrist 
is saying that the DSM-IV is so basic that even a person without training, for example, 
someone who is only devoted to opening and closing a door, is able to use it.  
 With “We need to transcend the DSM-IV and the ICD-10 criteria”, it is being suggested 
that the DSM-IV and the ICD-10 criteria are only useful at the lowest level of 
expertise and they need to get to higher levels. 
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In contrast, there are other values that the psychiatrist presents as contrary to the DSM-IV; 
these values are the ones expected from the residents. The professor presents it as follows: 
 With the statements “this is about patients’ experience” and “we need to come back to 
Jaspers’ phenomenology” the psychiatrist is proposing the options to transcend the 
DSM-IV and the ICD-10. With the first statement, he is saying that DSM-IV and ICD-10 
do not capture the patient’s experience and their task is to know this experience. 
With the second statement, he is arguing in favor of another tradition different to 
psychiatric standardized classifications, called phenomenology 7. 
In the second presentation, Julio qualifies his previous presentation as superficial because he 
did not understand the patient as a whole and was not paying attention to what was really 
happening. In these statements, we can note how the resident is constructing an alliance 
with the professor; as the professor did in the last presentation, now he also thinks that he 
was superficial; moreover, by recognizing his previous weaknesses, he is claiming that he 
had overcome the problem.  
It is the way in which “gringos” do things and you do not want to act like them 
The final comments of the professor give us another turn. “You see the difference when you 
interview by phone, do not fall into the “gringal” mechanical things, that is what “gringos” do”. 
An issue of psychiatric interviews and the use the DSM-IV becomes a matter of national 
science; in this case, the lesson is not to follow the approach of the psychiatry from the 
United States that is qualified as “mechanical”.  
Additionally, the use of expressions such as “gringal” and “gringos” as derogative ways to talk 
about the issues and persons from the United States is another way to discredit the 
implementation of telephonic interviews and the DSM-IV; it is something like this: “you do 
not want to carry out this sort of practices because you are going to act like a gringo”.  
The anecdotes reinforced this lesson. The first anecdote pictures the misdiagnosis and wrong 
treatments that come with a psychiatric model based on telephone interviews; a model that 
according to the professor is used by the “gringos”. The second anecdote is interesting 
                                                          
7 Jaspers has been considered one of the founders of psychiatric phenomenology in which extensive and detailed 
descriptions of patient’s experience are preferred rather than the classification of diseases based on specific 
criteria.   
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because of the inclusion of a Peruvian psychiatrist; this element suggests that the problem is 
not precisely about nationality, but about certain ways to do things that even someone who 
came from a country different to the United States is at risk of adopting.  These “gringal” 
ways are represented by the 300 dollars per half hour that this psychiatrist gains from the 
comfort of his house; in other words, Erik is suggesting that the “gringal” way values earning 
money fast and easy over the understanding and the welfare of patients.   
2.2.3 Lesson 2: Can I carry the DSM-IV around? Identifying the DSM-IV 
contexts, uses and users 
The second lesson is the product of two interviews to Albert, a resident who often carried 
with him the DSM-IV breviary. In the first interview, Albert was in his second year and in the 
second interview he was in his third year. During the interviews, Albert described how his 
relationship with DSM-IV was transformed, the limitations that he finds in this standard, the 
contexts inside the program in which its use is penalized, required or treated as desirable, 
the users who are able to put it in practice and the vision of the DSM-IV according to 
different international schools of psychiatry. I am going to discuss these issues through some 
fragments of the interviews.  
Penalizing the use: Stop carrying DSM-IV around because it can lead you to 
mistakes 
In the first interview, I asked Albert about why he always carried the DSM-IV with him and 
this was the answer:     
I do not carry it with me anymore because Doctor Erick… he laughed does not let me. What 
happened to me with the DSM-IV is that when I started the residency, it helped me a lot as a guide, 
to know the symptoms of disorders; but thereafter, especially Doctor Erick… and from what I have 
truly seen, sometimes the DSM-IV gets you to make mistakes. It has happened to me and the doctor 
(Erick) has lectured me because you try to enclose patients in this or other criteria and sometimes 
it fits; however, you go and see and it is not, it is another thing; but if you want, you can make it fit.   
The DSM-IV limits the patient too much, it says: “if a patient has these symptoms therefore it is 
this”, but it does not see many other things; for example, the patient’s context, the social 
component, the family component, what doctor Erick says, the existential component, what is 
really the origin of the problem; even though, there are organic pathologies that simulate a 
schizophrenic disorder and they fit in the DSM-IV, but you need to evaluate it very much better. 
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With Mrs. Maribel the following happened: Since she arrived at the clinic nobody knew what she 
had, everyone said that perhaps it was something psychotic because of her disorganized behavior; 
but I was doubtful. The only thing that we found in her was that she was disorganized in the way 
she dressed, in the way she acted, the anxiety that she was handling. Many psychiatrists that 
passed around here said that she was psychotic and I also said “well she is psychotic”, he laughed 
and continued, but one day Doctor Erick called me and told me “present the patients to me” and I 
presented her case and he said “So, anybody who is disorganized is psychotic” and then he told me 
“Tomorrow you are going to present me that case, I do not know how you are going to do it, but 
you are going to present it to me well, your rotation depends on it”.  
That night, at first I felt anxiety and then I interviewed three persons. With these interviews, I had 
an idea of her clinical picture; then, I got home, it was 10 PM and said to myself “Oh my god, what 
am I going to do tomorrow? What does this lady have?” I started reading and I find a clue thanks 
to the Diogenes syndrome8 because she had that, she is an accumulator and her house is messy. I 
read about the Diogenes syndrome and there it said that it can occur in different diagnosis and all 
her symptoms fit, it was Frontal Lobe Dementia. The Diogenes syndrome says “It can be an 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder”, but she did not have obsessive compulsive symptomatology; “it 
can be a Psychotic Disorder”, but she did not have hallucinations or delusions, perhaps the 
disorganization; “it can be Bipolar Affective Disorder”, but she is not bipolar; “it can be 
Parkinson’s”, she does not have Parkinson’s; “it can be a delusional disorder”, she does not have a 
delusional disorder because there are no delusions. And seeing her clinical picture, I started to 
read about frontal lobe dementia and it corresponded with her case; chronic, insidious, 
dysexecutive symptoms, apathetic, disinhibition, alterations in social behavior; that is what she 
has. Before that day, everyone treated it as a psychotic disorder and it was not, she has a dementia 
and you see, we fitted her in the DSM-IV as something psychotic and it was not. 
Sometimes I carried the DSM-IV with me, not because it is fundamental, but I used it as a reminder 
of one or another symptom; it is the good thing of the DSM-IV, it is very specific in the symptoms, 
as a reminder “what symptomatology presents this, what symptomatology presents the other”, to 
guide myself a bit; but I do not carry it anymore. I did not do it in an entirely conscious way, but 
one day I thought “what about that, I am not carrying that little book”. It was not something like 
this: “I am going to leave it because…” I stopped carrying it because I have not used it; it had 
ceased being indispensable for me. Especially, I stopped using it in the practices with Doctors Erick 
and Gustav, they have lectured me several times, they have said to me “DSM-IV no”, they have told 
me that it is only about symptoms and they are right because the DSM-IV is only symptoms.  
                                                          
8 The name of Diogenes syndrome came from the Greek philosopher Diogenes who was known for taking a life of 
poverty as a value.  
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This situation got my attention because a resident, who was physically attached to the DSM-
IV, suddenly was not. To carry some object around in your daily practice is not a minor 
detail, if you do not use an object a lot; you will not bother to carry it. Now, the resident 
underestimates the importance of this previous habit by claiming that the DSM-IV was not 
fundamental to him; nevertheless, this is an interpretation post facto, in other words, this 
interpretation depends on his current interpretation of DSM-IV as an object that gets him to 
make mistakes. Then, what made this object lose its importance? What made him stop 
carrying the DSM-IV around? 
The resident told us that he was able to note the mistakes that the DSM-IV was making him 
commit thanks to Erick and Gustav and also to his own experience. About his own 
experience, he said: from what I have truly seen, sometimes the DSM-IV gets you to make 
mistakes. With from what I have I have truly seen, he is telling us that he was wrong before 
and his experience has helped him see things how they “truly” are: sometimes the DSM-IV 
gets you to make mistakes. In regard to the influence of these professors, they have lectured 
him several times about not using the DSM-IV; moreover, as they have instructed him, now 
he considers that the DSM-IV limits the understanding of patients because it is solely about 
symptoms; ignoring components such as the context, the family, the existential experience, 
and the origin of  problems.    
The case of Mrs. Maribel is a good example of how the teachings of the professors and the 
resident’s experience interact. At first, Albert had doubts about the diagnosis, but he 
accepted it because of the authority of the other psychiatrists who had seen the patient. 
Later, his professor did not only encourage him to find other interpretations, but forced him 
by threatening him with failing his rotation if he did not prepare a good case. As happened in 
lesson 1, in this situation Erick is pushing the resident to learn something; again the lesson is 
not to trust the DSM-IV. Finally, through a stressing experience, Albert learned to construct a 
diagnosis different to the DSM-IV’s. 
Learning the right and wrong moments to use the standard: Sometimes you must 
carry DSM-IV and sometimes you must not, it depends on the professor   
In the second interview, I asked the resident if he had carried the DSM-IV with him again; 
this was the answer:  
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Yes, it depends on many things; mostly you use it depending on the professors or in some cases. In 
the clinical cases of the academic meetings, you always guide yourself by the DSM-IV because 
there are some professors who are very strict with the DSM-IV; then you have to carry it, open it 
and review the criteria; but, with other professors or in other occasions, no. In general, you use the 
DSM-IV throughout the training because it is a guide, but there are moments when it is needed 
more depending on the case, the professor, or the necessity. 
It depends on the training of each professor. There are professors who focus on the existential 
component of patients and it has nothing to do with the DSM-IV; however, there are others who 
use the DSM-IV as a tool that must be followed almost literally for the diagnosis, the prognosis and 
the treatment. Some of these professors use the DSM-IV as a base, others focus on understanding 
the patients in global and holistic ways; these last care about what the patients’ feelings are and 
why they are suffering without saying “yes, you have a major depression”. What DSM-IV does is “If 
you have this and this and this, it is called major depression” and that is it. But, what other 
professors say is that “it is not that important to give a diagnosis, the important issue is to see why 
patients are sad, in what way they are suffering and what I can do for them right now; we have all 
the time to propose a diagnosis, if we ever give one”. Now, the professors who use the DSM-IV 
strictly do it very well, they do their diagnosis and interventions according to it and they do it well. 
Nevertheless, there are other professors who really do not like it and told us “do not let me see you 
with the DSM-IV, do not bring it around here”.  
In this fragment we have another variation, the use of the DSM-IV is not always penalized, it 
depends on the professors. According to their relationship with the DSM-IV, the resident 
classifies the professors in two groups:  
1. The DSM group: This group follows the DSM-IV almost literally and forces the 
resident to use it. 
2. The existential group: This group understands the patient in a holistic way and 
lectures the resident if they see him using the DSM-IV. 
Handling uncertainty: You can use the DSM-IV to address new situations 
The following fragment is from the second interview  
In some moments you consult the DSM-IV to see the criteria; for example, when you see a new 
topic. Right now, I am encountering child psychiatry, then I go to the DSM-IV because I have never 
seen children, to see the criteria on children; or, when I passed by psychoactive substances 
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disorders, I reviewed the DSM-IV criteria. However, I will not focus only on it, I have to read other 
texts; but yes, it works for every new subject such as psychoactive substances, psychogeriatrics, 
one goes and reads it a bit. 
Here we find how, despite the resident feeling closer to the existential group, he uses the 
DSM-IV in certain moments by his own will; in this case to have a starting point to face topics 
that he has never seen.  However, it is only one tool among many to deal with the uncertainty 
of new situations. 
When the reductionism is not that bad: Using the DSM-IV for research 
The following fragment is from the second interview  
I will only use the DSM-IV for research, as unified criteria for research used in a general level 
I asked if in research the DSM-IV is not reductionist and he said:  
Yes, but it is because it is too hard to take into account so many variables, especially in psychiatry 
it is very hard; then, to delimitate the research, the DSM-IV reductionism is used. Obviously, it is a 
reductionism; but, at least I am going to be able to find a more or less homogenous group of 
patients according to some criteria. However, if I have the patients here and I start seeing them 
one by one, none is like the other, they are only similar in the diagnosis. “Why does this patient 
have Bipolar Affective Disorder? Why does this patient have more crises than the other?” because 
their families are different. There are too many things that are not always susceptible to be 
homogenous, it is impossible. You try to use the most relevant variables to choose a group: BPAD 
(Bipolar Affective Disorder), plus a more or less similar group; for example, a group with more or 
less the same school years. Generally it happens in all the researches, it is very hard to control all 
the variables and the DSM-IV helps us homogenize the diagnoses.     
In research, the reductionism of DSM-IV is not only accepted, but embraced as desirable 
because it allows homogenizing the patient’s diagnosis to measure specific variables.  
The DSM-IV is in the lowest level of expertise: It is so simple that even a 
“doorman” can use it 
The next fragment is from the second interview:  
It is necessary to read the DSM-IV to have a starting point for the diagnosis, but thereafter there 
are too many things. It is like an “initial help” in quotation marks, it is the most basic thing, so to 
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speak. It is the most basic because the criteria are given clearly and it is like a checklist “the A 
criteria for depression says that if the patient has had a depressive mood for most of the time, for 
almost every day for two weeks, it is depression”. Basically it is saying: “Have you felt that? Yes”.  
The DSM-IV is the most basic in psychiatry because it is like a checklist; but thereafter, the 
problem of depression has too many things, it is not only to fill symptoms, but why it happens, the 
psychodynamic component, the cognitive component, the genetic component. Any person can 
learn the 10 items of  depression and will be able to do a DSM-IV diagnosis, even though, this 
person will be able to give treatment; but does not know why, neither where this nor that came 
from. I simply use the DSM-IV to see the criteria that have been achieved by common agreement in 
North America and in the rest of the west, only as a guide; but thereafter, there are a lot of things 
because if I stay only with DSM-IV, I am minimizing the patient, reducing a lot the 
interdisciplinarity, the multidisciplinary that a human being has.  
As Doctor Erick said to us “if the doorman reads the DSM-IV he will be able to do diagnosis and 
will send me the patient: Doctor Erick, this one is depressed”; but thereafter what is left? The DSM-
IV is basic diagnostic criteria that work as a guide, but thereafter there are many things: genetics, 
psychology, psychodynamics, cognitive behavioral, philosophy if you want; there are many things, 
why is something happening to a patient?  
In this fragment, the resident argues that the DSM-IV is in the lowest level of expertise inside 
psychiatry because it is just a checklist that anybody is able to fill; he only uses it because he 
is a western psychiatry resident and he has to know the agreements that are settled in 
western psychiatry. Furthermore, he considers that if psychiatrists stick only to this 
simplicity, they are reducing the human being’s complexity. In contrast, the higher expertise 
levels are to know why things happen and recognize several dimensions such as: psychology, 
psychodynamics, cognitive-behavioral, genetics and philosophy.  
A standard for anybody: Is anyone really able to use the DSM-IV efficiently? 
In the second interview the resident said:  
Obviously the DSM-IV has too much clinical language and I have to translate it to the patient. I am 
not going to ask the patient “have you have felt anhedonia almost every day for the last 15 days?” 
because the patient is not going to understand. It is the same if I say to the patient “cephalalgia”; I 
have to translate it to the patient, “have you had headaches in the last days?” Then, what is 
“anhedonia”? “The loss of interest in things that were interesting before”. Then, I told the patient 
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“Have you lost interest in the things that you liked before? What did you like to do and now you do 
not? Why does it not appeal to you anymore?” That is it. 
I asked Albert about what he thought in regard to a doorman being able to use DSM-IV and 
he said:           
I think it could happen, a trained person who counts with the instruction about what anhedonia is 
should be able to do it because it is too easy. The DSM-IV tells you “there are 10 criteria for major 
depression, if the patient fills five it is depression” who would not be able to do it? It is simple 
anhedonia means this, hyporexia means that the patient has diminished appetite, thoughts of 
worthlessness means ideas that you are an inferior person; and that is it, it will not take much. 
About who is able to offer this training, the resident said: 
A general physician    
I asked if there are not any complicated aspects of the DSM-IV and the answer was the 
following: 
Yes, there are some terms that only psychiatrists are able to understand; for example the 
Dissociative Disorders are a bit harder to understand for a general physician or any health 
professional because these disorders are only intervened by psychiatry; nobody else studies them. 
Another example is Hypochondria, the psychiatrist is the only one who knows what Hypochondria 
is, and other people do not know it very well.  
Again, I asked if this can be explained to the doorman  
It could be if a psychiatrist spends a bit of time 
About the time that a person would need to spend in order to understand the DSM-IV, Albert 
said: 
What I will do in a hypothetical case is the following: Let us say that I have a private practice, I 
have my secretary and I tell her: “You have to do the triage for me”. The triage is classifying what 
kind of disease a patient has and the secretary has no clue; then I pass her a summary “Miss 
Juliana, the ten most prevalent disorders that I treat are these, there you have this summary of the 
criteria and you ask this”. I will not give her the DSM-IV, but a page that says: instead of hyporexia, 
decreased appetite; instead of anhedonia, loss of interest. Also, I will not pass her all the diagnosis, 
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but the ten most important disorders in my private practice. There are scales based on the DSM-IV 
that ask this sort of thing and with short explanations anybody is able to use them. Then, I can give 
her the scales for Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, for Depression, for Anxiety, for Psychosis…With 
short instructions these scales can be applied even by a secretary. It is just checking “you have 
this…check”. 
I asked if there are moments in which patients give him ambiguous answers and he said:  
Yes, it happens because sometimes patients have other terms to say things; for example, there are 
people who speaking about anxiety say “I am anxious”; but there are others who say “Sometimes I 
feel a taco9”, “Sometimes I cannot breathe well”; others say “the uneasiness”, “the nervousness”; 
there are many things. Then, if a patient tells me “I am very nervous”, I will say “Explain to me how 
you are nervous? What symptoms do you have? What does it mean to be nervous?” Yes, you have 
to translate what the patient says to be able to say “yes, medically it is anxiety” because each 
person from different regions of the country uses different words for the same thing.  
As a metaphor, a doorman being able to use the DSM-IV works to tell the residents that the 
DSM-IV is in the lowest level of the psychiatric knowledge; however, for Albert this metaphor 
can be literal. Albert’s prime premise is that the DSM-IV is easy to understand and with short 
instructions anyone is able to use it efficiently; nevertheless, I find some tricky issues in his 
arguments that made me think that it is not that easy.  
The first issue is translations: There are words that require to be translated for a lay person 
to understand the DSM-IV; for example, anhedonia, thoughts of worthlessness and hyporexia. 
But, how many technical words does the DSM-IV have? Just in a quick overview of its 
content, I found the following chapters: “Delirium, Dementia, and Amnesic and other 
Cognitive Disorders”, “Schizophrenia and Other Psychotic Disorders”, “Mood disorders”, 
“Anxiety Disorders”, “Somatoform Disorders”, “Factitious Disorders”, among others. So, only 
in the content there are at least 10 words to learn; besides each of these disorders has more 
or less 10 criteria, so there are at least 100 technical words to be translated.  
It also works in the other direction. To translate regional expressions into the DSM-IV’s 
technical language is even more complex and for this process the experience to know how to 
fix the meaning of both narratives is required. Albert gave us some examples such as “I feel a 
taco”, “I cannot breathe well”, “the uneasiness” and “the nervousness”; all these expressions 
                                                          
9 “Taco” is a word to talk about chest tightness  
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can be related to the diagnosis of anxiety, but this can be only determined by the clinician’s 
expertise.    
The second issue is the training. This training can be done by a general physician, but there 
are some topics that are only known by psychiatrists like Dissociative Disorders and 
Hypochondria10. So, socialization with the insiders of the field is needed to learn to diagnose 
all of the DSM-IV disorders.  
The third issue is the scales. The scales are based on the DSM-IV and the hypothetical 
secretary will be able to handle those with short instructions; still, she requires that the 
psychiatrist tells her the ten most prevalent disorders, selects the instruments and 
constantly supervises her. Moreover, she will only be able to handle the ten most prevalent 
disorders, but not the entire DSM-IV. 
In conclusion, people who are not a part of the field are not able to use the DSM-IV efficiently 
on their own; to use it, they will need training and supervision by those who are already part 
of the psychiatry collective. 
International affairs: DSM-IV, “trying” to speak the same language and the 
different international psychiatry schools 
In the first interview the resident said:  
The DSM-IV is important for trying to speak the same language because it is used in most of the 
western countries, in almost the entire world. It is for the understanding among all, for the 
unification of the psychiatric language. In the other aspect in which it is used is for research, to try 
to define more specific and exact inclusion criteria for patients in different countries. 
Some professors say that in the United States they are too mechanic using it: they fit the patients 
in a diagnosis, the patients have to take a medication and the issue is over. What is said is that in 
North America the DSM-IV is used a lot without the analysis of the patient, but in Europe the 
existential component is more relevant; therefore, they do not use the DSM-IV a lot. For example, 
they have told us that French psychiatry is more holistic.  
                                                          
10 Although we all have an idea about the relationship between Hypochondria, pain and psychological conflicts; 
Hypochondria has been very challenging in the medical practice since its pain can be related to many other 
conditions. Then, before even considering a diagnosis of Hypochondria, physicians perform a lot of tests that are 
usually inconclusive. Lastly, after years of treatments and consultations, a patient with this condition is referred to 
psychiatry as a last resource.  
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In some measure, the DSM-IV facilitated in quotation marks “to understand the patient” in 
different countries, to try to speak the same language among psychiatrists from Colombia, 
psychiatrists from the United States, European psychiatrists. When we need to try to define a 
patient in a certain pathology and when we need it for research, we use the DSM-IV. 
I told him that trying sounds like something that cannot entirely be achieved and he said: 
It is not entirely achieved, it is to look for those inclusion criteria that specify “this patient has 
more or less the same in Spain and Colombia” and try to give some homogeneity to the patients for 
research, but it is only an attempt to say “yes, they are more or less homogenous”, looking for more 
reliability in the research, but it fails in being achieved.                      
In the second interview Albert continued:  
I use it because in a western level it is a guide that psychiatrists use to speak more or less the same 
language; then, despite not liking it very much, I have to read it to position myself in reference to 
the western context because all the psychiatrists speak in reference to “the DSM-IV language”, so 
to speak, in quotation marks; I have to read it and to know it as a psychiatrist.   
It used to be the first option in North America, now it is being left aside for its simplicity. However, 
as a resident and as a psychiatrist, I have to know what the DSM-IV is, use it in practice and be 
able to critique it or not, to say “I am using because it helped me or not”. In the training process, 
you need to read it, to know what it is. 
This resident has made it clear that he does not like the DSM-IV; however, it is a referent in 
his context and he is forced to know it to be able to communicate with psychiatrists from the 
western countries; then, he has to adopt the DSM-IV “language”. Moreover, for him, using the 
DSM-IV in practice is inescapable because he needs to be able to take a position about it. 
Otherwise, as in the first lesson, the DSM-IV is also an issue of national science. In the first 
interview, Albert located on opposite sides North American psychiatry, especially the one 
from the United States, and European psychiatry, especially the one from France. On the one 
hand, North American psychiatry is catalogued as mechanical and therefore uses the DSM-IV 
a lot; on the other hand, European psychiatry does not use the DSM-IV very much because it 
is holistic. In the second interview, as it has happened in his own process, he now considers 
that the DSM-IV is so simple that even North American psychiatrists are leaving it aside.          
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Finally, can the residents carry the DSM-IV around? 
There is not a single answer, what these interviews have shown is that the DSM-IV is not a 
monolithic standard; for example, its use can be penalized or mandatory according to the 
professor and the context; and other times it is desirable, for example to face new situations 
or in research. Still, the resident’s balance is negative since he considers that using the DSM-
IV can lead him to make mistakes and it is reductionist. 
Through the metaphor of a doorman being able to use the DSM-IV, his professor is coaching 
him to know that the use of the DSM-IV cannot distinguish him as a psychiatrist because it 
operates at the lowest level of expertise inside the field. It is like this: “the DSM-IV is so 
simple that even a doorman can use it, you have to know other things to be distinguished 
from a doorman”; for example to know why things happen to patients and the multiple 
dimensions of human complexity.  
In contrast, Albert has taken the metaphor of the doorman literally by claiming that anybody 
with short instructions will be able to use the DSM-IV. However, I have analyzed this claim 
based on his descriptions and it cannot be possible without socialization, experience and 
supervision from those who are part of the field. 
Likewise, the resident recognizes that, even if he does not like the DSM-IV, he is forced to 
know it because it is the referent of the western psychiatry; to not know its language will 
exclude him.  
Lastly, the DSM-IV is the object of international controversies. The resident identifies the 
North American school with reductionism and a high rate in the use of the DSM-IV (taking 
into account that this is changing) and the European school with a low use of this standard 
because it prefers a holistic perspective that takes into account the existential dimension of 
human beings.   
2.2.4 Lesson 3: The DSM-IV is an interested standard  
During a class, Erik argued that the DSM-IV is fallacious because it is the product of many 
interests; in his words: 
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Until the DSM-III Postpartum Depression was the most frequent kind of Depression in the United 
States. The DSM-IV has influences from: Insurance companies, the pharmaceutical industry, 
political interest groups such as gays and lesbians, and the Jews. What happened? The insurance 
companies presented statistics saying that Postpartum Depression was the most frequent type of 
Depression and its treatment was costing thousands of millions. After that, a controversy arose in 
the design of the DSM-IV and the influence of the insurance companies was so great that they 
eliminated Postpartum Depression as a diagnosis. Then, women that get depressed after giving 
birth do not have the right to be treated with the diagnosis of Postpartum Depression; they have 
denied the postpartum services, they disappeared it from the DSM-IV.   
It is the game of the DSM-IV that one can see. How can we treat women? We cannot treat them. 
That calmed down the insurance companies. The DSM-IV is fallacy of many interests, that is why 
the DSM-V has being unable to be finished because it is a huge controversy…it is the land of all and 
the land of nobody. Now, progressive groups from the United States have questioned the entire 
diagnostic handbook; what it is more, they are not teaching it; and instead they are recovering the 
phenomenological existential approach in psychiatry. 
Once more Erick is criticizing the DSM-IV in his classes; in this case, he claims that the DSM-
IV is a fallacy of many interests. Specifically, he wants to dismiss the DSM-IV by arguing that it 
is influenced by groups with power and economic interests. The idea is sustained by three 
arguments:  
1. The exemplar case: by presenting the case of Postpartum Depression, Erick is telling 
us that there is proof of the existence of the interests and how these are in opposition 
to reality and the welfare of patients. There was something that happened in reality 
called Postpartum Depression and the insurance companies with their economic 
interests managed to disappear it even at the cost of hurting women.  
2. The difficulties on agreements: the second proof of the interests is the difficulties to 
reach an agreement in the DSM-V; for him, there are so many interests that it has 
been hard to dispense with them. 
3. The inside witnesses: He is not the only one who is aware of the interests, even some 
progressive groups of the United States, the country in which the DSM-IV is mostly 
designed, have noticed this and therefore they have decided not to teach the DSM-IV 
because they do not trust it.  
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2.2.5 Lessons in the academic meetings 
The academic meetings are weekly activities where psychiatrists, psychiatry residents and 
medical students meet; the psychiatrists of the clinic do not assist. In these meetings, the 
residents prepare a topic or a case study that they consider relevant and it is evaluated by the 
psychiatrists. In the lessons of the academic meetings, there were interactions from the 
following characters: 
1. Psychiatrists: Emerald, Angelique, Pierre and Morpheus 
2. Residents: Aaron (third year resident), Luis (third year resident) and Jesus (first year 
resident). 
2.2.6 Lesson 4: Looking for alternatives: the GLPD against the DSM-IV 
Aaron presented a case study and in the introduction proposed the following: 
We are going to see a multi-axial approach different from the one of the DSM-IV11; the idea is to 
draw upon these clinical cases to see other ways of doing things. In this order of ideas, I am going 
to present the Latin American Guide for Psychiatric Diagnosis (GLDP).    
The case was about a teenager who suffered a condition called Acute Disseminated 
Encephalitis. After Aaron presented the case, he explained the GLDP:  
I am going to present you in general terms the Latin American Guide for Psychiatric Diagnosis, it 
is based on the International Classification of Diseases and I find it interesting to see this other 
perspective because in reality, instead of other guides for diagnosis, this is the one that according 
to the law we are supposed to be using.  
In reality they are not so different, but I think this one allows more flexibility for the diagnosis. The 
guide says that the diagnosis, more than identifying diseases or distinguishing some diseases from 
others, is to assist in the way in which I can help the patient. It does not only say “this patient has 
an Acute Disseminated Encephalitis”, but what are we going to do about it. 
They talk about an integral diagnostic formulation composed by two interrelated elements:  
                                                          
11 The DSM-IV evaluates patients in five axes as follows: axis one: clinical disorders, axis two: personality and 
development disorders, axis three: relevant physical disorders, axis four: psychosocial and environmental 
problems and axis five: global functioning.     
45 
 
 
 
1) A multi-axial standardized formulation based on the ICD-10 that follows similar guidelines to the 
DSM-IV’s, but it is constructed based on the different multi-axial guides of diagnosis that have 
been used in Latin America; there is a Brazilian one, we have the Cuban Glossary, other from Costa 
Rica and another one from Argentina. 
2) An ideographic personalized formulation that is about what happens with patients 
The multi-axial standardized formulation is as follows: In the first axis we have the clinical 
disorders and related problems, in this axis all the patient disorders are mentioned; it is similar to 
DSM’s first and fourth axes. The second axis is about the areas of disability, self-care, occupational 
functioning and familiar functioning. The third axis addresses the contextual factors, psychosocial 
and environmental problems. The fourth axis evaluates the quality of life. 
The ideographic formulation has three sections: 
1) Clinical problems and its contextualization: This is a shared formulation; then you ask the family 
and the patient “what do you think is going on with you? How does this affect you? What happens 
in your house and work? And what are you going to do about it?” In this section we include the 
biological, psychological, social and cultural explanations according to the patient’s clinical 
picture. 
2) Relevant positive factors of the patient that can aid the treatment and the promotion of health. 
3) Expectations about the restoration and promotion of health: What is to be expected from the 
treatment? What are the goals? What is the prognosis? And what is the life quality going to be? 
As the introduction to the case, Aaron prepared the audience with the following statements: 
We are going to see a multi-axial approach different from the one of the DSM-IV; the idea is to 
draw upon these clinical cases to see other ways of doing things. He knows that this audience is 
used to the DSM-IV and maybe does not know the GLPD; then he appeals to some sort of 
“scientific curiosity” saying that this is the moment to try alternative ways of doing things.  
Once the interest of the audience is captured, Aaron makes the argument more serious: 
Instead of other guides for diagnosis, this is the one that according to the law we are supposed 
to be using. This is not anymore about “scientific curiosity”, but about legal regulation. With 
other guides he is talking about the DSM-IV; hence he is saying that they must stop using the 
DSM-IV and pay attention to the GLDP because by law the latter is mandatory. 
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Aaron keeps this going: In reality they are not so different, but I think this one allows more 
flexibility for the diagnosis. So, they are similar, but the GLDP is better because it is more 
flexible.  
He continues: The guide says that the diagnosis, more that identifying diseases or distinguishing 
some diseases from others, is to assist in the way in which I can help the patient. If you 
remember dear reader, this is one of the critiques that in the previous lessons was enacted 
against the DSM-IV, the DSM-IV only serves the purpose of diagnosing but does not help 
people; therefore, this is another aspect in which the GLDP is superior to the DSM-IV. 
The GLDP diagnostic formulation has two components: The multi-axial standardized 
formulation and the ideographic personalized formulation. The standardized formulation 
connects the international standards (it is based on the ICD-10 and follows similar guidelines 
to the DSM-IV’s) and the regional classifications (from Cuba, Brazil, Costa Rica and Argentina). 
In other words, this is a standardized formulation but one that recognizes international 
tendencies and is sensitive to the regional dynamics. The ideographic personalized 
formulation is proposed again as superior in comparison to the DSM-IV; while in this 
formulation it is possible to include different forms of explanations such as: biological, 
psychological, social and cultural; in lesson 2 Albert critiqued the DSM-IV because it does not 
take into account several components such as genetics, psychology and psychodynamics.  
Finally, it is remarkable how Aaron needs to use the DSM-IV as a constant referent for 
comparison; and even though the DSM-IV is not the device that he likes the most, he 
recognizes that it is the standard and if he wants to implement different ways of doing things, 
he needs to prove that these ways are better than the established ones. 
2.2.7 Lesson 5: The DSM-V is still an unstable fact, but it will be stable 
The last four lessons took place during a meeting for the discussion of the recently published 
DSM-V; for this meeting, Luis prepared a presentation about the changes in the category of 
depression from the DSM-IV to the DSM-V; he started: 
In the DSM-IV TR (text revision) the Depressive Disorders and the Bipolar Affective disorders came 
in a group called Mood Disorders; instead, in the DSM-V the Depressive Disorders became an 
exclusive chapter called Depressive Disorders. These disorders include: a new diagnosis called 
Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder; the Major Depressive Disorder which continues without 
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variations with the exception of some considerations about duel; the Persistent Depressive 
Disorder, a new label for the consolidation of two DSM-IV diagnoses; the Premenstrual Dysphoric 
Disorder that was not a specified disorder in the DSM-IV and now it is a specific depressive 
disorder; the Disorders Induced By Substances and Medications; the Disorders Due To Medical 
Condition that was not modified; the Other Specified Disorders; and the Unspecified Disorders. 
Pierre and Emerald asked for the presence of the categories of Minor Depression and 
Recurrent Brief Depression; the first was not included and the second reformulated. 
Now, each of the depressive disorders received its own discussion in which psychiatrists and 
residents talked about the meaning of the changes, the implications in the treatments, the 
contradictions of some symptoms, the good and bad aspects of the DSM-V and the diagnosis 
that gained and lost importance; nevertheless, I am going to describe the discussion of the 
diagnosis denominated Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder as a model for three 
reasons: 1) Being the first diagnosis in the list, it worked as an introduction in which the 
DSM-V foundations were discussed, 2) it is a new category and therefore represents the 
changes in the boundaries of the field, and 3) the other categories were discussed in a similar 
way but the discussion of this one was wider. In regard to this diagnosis Luis said: 
According to the authors this diagnosis was included because there was a concern about children 
that show persistent irritability, tantrums and intermittent explosive behavior being over 
diagnosed with Bipolar Affective Disorder (BPAD). In contrast, the evidence was showing that in 
the long term these symptoms were not related that much with BPAD, but with Depressive 
Disorder. Then, with this diagnosis the over diagnosis of BPAD in adolescents can decrease. 
Then, he explained the criteria of this diagnosis and it produced the following discussion:  
Emerald: What gets my attention is that this, with little variations, comes from the chapter of 
impulse control; this is an Intermittent Explosive Disorder. 
Luis: They said that it is completely different from the Intermittent Explosive Disorder and they 
cannot coexist.  
Angelique: There are differences because in the Intermittent Explosive Disorder the patient comes 
back to the intercritical level and says “what happened here? I had no control”; instead, in this 
one, they continue irritable and with a bad temper all the time. 
Emerald: Yes, but it is very hard to separate them  
Angelique: The other issue is that in this one, they are giving more importance to the affective 
symptoms and less to the behavioral. 
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Emerald: We need to see what they left in the Intermittent Explosive because they are very similar  
Luis continued his presentation: 
They said that the prevalence is unclear, they point out that there are many doubts about the real 
numbers, but a greater prevalence is expected in men and children. 
This produced another debate: 
Emerald: This is still debatable; this is the only depressive disorder in which the prevalence is 
greater in men, all others are more prevalent in women. It is very strange, they said that they 
do not know the prevalence…and all of this is probably related with the behavior, with the 
environment and with childhood “neurotic” traits that point to some personalities; to classify 
this as depressive is risky. I understand the preoccupation to say “bipolarity is being over 
diagnosed”, that is fine; but I do not know how evident this is. 
Luis: Also, the criteria for age are not very clear or are mutually contradictory. For example, they 
say that this diagnosis is for persons between 6 and 18 years old, but the H criteria says 
textually “by observational history, the disorder starts before the age of 10 years”; then, one 
wonders: “could it be that I will diagnose a 16 year old patient? It is in the range, but what 
should I do?” 
Angelique: Besides, when they talk about prevalence, where does it come from if the diagnosis did 
not exist before the publication of the DSM-V? It came from the experts’ consensus. The people 
who met to discuss this said: “I have had some patients that are like this and this, those 
patients have different manifestations, they evolve differently and they were not bipolar, Let us 
include them here”. I do not know what other arguments they had, maybe some case reports 
because it is impossible to talk about the prevalence of a pathology which until now has not 
been categorized and therefore it could not be studied in an epidemiological study.       
Luis: They say that it comes from registered rates reported by the clinical experts        
Emerald said: I always believe in the good intention of taxonomists, in terms of this concern about 
patients because it is worse if you receive a diagnosis of BPAD once you are seven, eight or nine 
years old and you start being prescribed with mood modulators or atypical antipsychotics; but, 
it is still in the air.  
Pierre: It is still very green12  
                                                          
12 The word “green” is allusive to the color of fruits: the green fruits are those that are not ripe (as in English). In 
this context the expression “green” is a synonym of immaturity; therefore Pierre is saying that the DSM-V is not 
yet ripe/mature.      
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In the discussion of these issues the group laughed a lot, I asked why and this was the 
answer:   
Emerald: The apparent laugh is because it keeps being polemic, it is a situation that concerns us 
all and there are so many opinions: some are in favor and some are against it. Also,  a lot has 
been said about the pressure from the pharmaceutical industry behind the classifications; I 
cannot deny this pressure, but I do not entirely agree with that because I think that people are 
very serious; especially psychiatrists, they know what this implicates for people’s lives. Thus, I 
believe in the experts.  
Latin American experts who participated in the DSM-V came to the last psychiatry congress 
and told us of the intimacies of the discussions; they said that it was not easy, but that it was a 
serious work. The positions of some people, the positions of the others, the things that were 
discussed, the hours that they spent modifying a term and looking for agreement; all of this 
says that there was real work. 
At the end of the presentation Jesus pointed out:  
In one year this is going to be the psychiatric language 
These were these answers: 
Lucas:  The third took a long time  
Emerald: It will take three or four years; however, in the third version there was no internet, and 
now everybody has it. 
Jesus: All the studies are going to quote it  
Lucas and Angelique with one voice: No 
Lucas: The studies will take at least five years to adopt the DSM-V 
Emerald concluded:  
All of this implies that we have to appropriate this, to discuss, to look at how it is; we are in this 
gray stage13, we are in a stage of transition in which it is hard to appropriate the classification, to 
understand it well. It is probably going to be imposed as happened with the third edition, the 
fourth and the revised fourth because we cannot deny that it is planned as something global with 
the goal of governing everybody with a single classification; also Latin America is in a great 
degree dominated by the North American culture. Nevertheless, the psychiatric department took 
                                                          
13 The color “gray” is used to denote fuzzy moments in which you do not know exactly how things are because you 
cannot distinguish if they are “black” or “white” (as in English). In this context it is used as a synonym of transition.  
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the decision that until things are clearer, we will mention to the medical students the existence of 
the DSM-V; but with them, we will still use the DSM-IV TR with the goal of avoiding all this 
confusion.         
The introduction of the DSM-V in the program implies the redefinition of the boundaries of 
psychiatric diseases; there are several examples: Depression has been located as a superior 
category (it used to be a Mood Disorder together with the BPAD, now it has its own chapter 
as Depressive Disorders), there is a new category called Disruptive Mood Dysregulation 
Disorder, the category of Major Depressive Disorder suffered minimal modifications and 
many other changes listed by Luis. 
About the category of Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder, the DSM-V designers argue 
that there is an over diagnosis of BPAP in adolescents and this was determined thanks to 
evidence which has shown that many adolescent diagnosed with BPAP were depressive; 
therefore, the DSM-V decided to include this diagnosis to solve the problem. With this 
argument, the designers are telling the readers that the DSM-V is a dependable standard 
because its changes are based on empirical evidence.   
In contrast, the members of the program are not entirely sure of the DSM-V empirical 
foundation as can be noted in the positions of Emerald and Angelique as follows: 
 Emerald: For Emerald, the empirical foundation is still debatable and strange; and 
even though she thinks that there is good will in the new diagnosis, for her, it is not 
evident14.  
 Angelique: Angelique does not believe that there can be empirical grounding of a 
diagnosis that did not exist until the publication of DSM-V; instead, she considers that 
it is the product of the experts’ consensus. 
These arguments make them conclude that the DSM-V is still in the air, it is still “green” (see 
footnote 10), it keeps being polemic, it is in a gray stage (see footnote 11) that makes it hard to 
use and it is not appropriate for general physicians until it becomes clearer. In other words, it 
is still an unstable fact.  
                                                          
14 These are not the same doubts that Erick has in regards to the DSM-IV interests (lesson 3). Emerald does not 
deny the pressure of the pharmaceutical companies, but she believes that it is not effecting the good work of the 
experts; especially because they have offered testimony by talking about the intimacy of their work and offering 
many details such as the long time that they spent working even on minor details and the difficulties that they had 
to achieve agreements.   
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However, they consider that this instability will not last forever. Emerald claims that it is 
probably going to be imposed as happened with the previous editions. Jesus is very 
enthusiastic about it, claiming that in one year this is going to be the psychiatric language 
because all the studies are going to quote it. In contrast, the professors were more cautious: It 
will take three or four years and the studies will take at least five years to adopt the DSM-V.  
Still, in this case the diffusion can be quicker thanks to the worldwide possibilities of the 
internet.  
Finally, for Emerald this is also matter of cultural and intellectual colonialism: we cannot deny 
that it is planned as something global with the goal of governing everybody with a single 
classification; also Latin America is in great degree dominated by the North American culture. 
In this case, she considers that North America is a cultural referent that commands Latin 
American culture and the psychiatric classifications are no exception.   
2.2.8 Lesson 6: The DSM changes are the proof of the psychiatric diagnostic 
evolution 
During the meeting for the discussion of the DSM-V, the construction and changes in 
psychiatric diagnosis were also addressed as follows:     
Angelique: The inclusion of new diagnosis in any historical moment is derived from 
phenomenology, observation, experience and not from epidemiological studies; it does not 
mean that one is more valid than the other. A construct called depression is made, from there 
the epidemiological studies are done and maybe in another historical moment it will be said 
about this category: “No, there were three or four characteristics that were not part of that 
diagnosis”. The psychiatric diagnoses evolve. 
Pierre: If you read a book of the Paisas15 that some time ago was an emblem in psychiatry, the 
authors said about the Affective Personality Disorder the following: “Many scholars consider 
that in reality the Affective Personality Disorder is a minor diagnosis, but some day it could be 
classified as one of the most important Bipolar Affective Disorders” and this diagnosis 
disappeared. Then, one day a medical student asked me if “in psychiatry you drop and adopt 
diseases as your wish?” and I said: “do not be so clumsy, it has been reclassified; that 
personality disorder became in reality a cyclothymic version of the Bipolar Disorder”. That is 
what is happening here, we are not inventing a disease named Disruptive Mood Dysregulation 
Disorder, but they are trying to reclassify to avoid confusions with other disorders such as 
                                                          
15 “Paisas” are those who came from the Antioquia department in Colombia 
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Bipolarity, Oppositional Defiant Disorder, ADD (Attention Deficit Disorder) and Intermittent 
Explosive Disorder. 
Emerald: For example, the DSM-II had the Psychotic and Neurotic Disorders. In the neurotic there 
was anxiety, OCD (Obsessive Compulsive Disorder) everything. It obeys to the intention of 
better understanding, of seeing the variations of the same thing. The DSMs have been criticized 
a bit for that, why are there so many diseases, so many classifications? But we must not forget 
that: 1) psychiatry has much less time than the other specialties in the classification process; 2) 
the other diseases are classified by etiology and in psychiatry we are barely starting to 
understand thanks to diagnostic imaging and genetics.  
Pierre: There were three boxes: Neurosis, Psychosis and Personality Disorders; everything was in 
Neurosis. Then, there were research reports which said that the Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
was different from the Panic Attack and a Social Phobia was not similar to a Specific Phobia; 
they were only similar because they produce anxiety. The same has happened in all the other 
fields of medicine; I remember an old journal in which Koch, who discovered the Koch bacillus 
said: “In my last article I affirmed that the Koch bacillus produced Tuberculosis, now I say that 
it is produced by the bacillus plus malnutrition plus other things”. In psychiatry the same 
happens, we are trying to specify “this is related with this, this other thing with this”.   
Angelique explains the construction of new psychiatric diagnosis in the following sequence: 
The starting point is observation, following the observation constructs are proposed (in this 
case a construct called depression), then, epidemiological studies are performed and finally 
the constructs are improved by leaving aside the unrelated symptoms.  
In a similar fashion, Pierre claims that the changes in DSM categories are the product of 
scientific advance. At first, there were only three boxes: Neurosis, Psychosis and Personality 
Disorders; however, these boxes did not allow too much differentiation of psychiatric 
disorders; then, thanks to researches, it was possible to prove that all the things that 
once were considered the same, in reality were different; finally this process is reflected in 
the DSM changes; for example the inclusion of new categories called Disruptive Mood 
Dysregulation Disorder. 
Likewise, Emerald argues that in the DSM-II there were only two options for diagnosing: 
Psychosis and Neurosis. Later, thanks to the efforts to understand mental disorders, the 
options to classify have been increased. Now, the DSM has been criticized because it has 
changed a lot in relatively short periods of time; but this is explained by Emerald as due to 
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the psychiatric classifications’ incipient tradition in which the etiology of disorders has not 
been identified making it hard to classify.   
The positions of these professors point to something similar: DSM categories change in 
consonance with scientific advancement in a progressive and accumulative way. 
2.2.9 Lesson 7: Between the DSM-IV, the DSM-V and the ICD-10 no more, no 
less 
In the final discussions of the meeting, the group said the following: 
Emerald: As specialists, we have to pay more attention to this, but the classification in hospitals, 
clinics and wherever you work are going to be in contradiction with the DSM-V because the 
ICD is not being actualized at the same speed. Thus, if you do a diagnosis and go to the clinical 
record of any clinic, you will have to use the ICD-10 again. This is a complex stage. 
Angelique: We are between three classifications: The DSM-IV TR, the DSM-V and the ICD-10. The 
ICD is not going to be changed because the Ministry of Health has told us that we cannot 
modify the entire software.     
Morpheus: Besides, it is an international consensus. The fact that we have a North American 
orientation does not mean that it is the same in the rest of South America. It is an obligation 
for us as specialists to understand that there is a DSM-V, to know that the ICD-10 is mandatory 
for the health statistics and to realize that for now we are going to be governed by the DSM-IV 
TR.        
I asked if the GLPD could be considered a fourth standard that residents have to learn and 
they said: 
Pierre: There are some local classifications: the Cuban, the French, the Argentinian; but all of them 
have a tendency towards a unique classification: The DSM and the ICD. 
Angelique: More local classifications are made for specific goals. The DSM-IV’s goal is trying to be 
atheoretical by only giving a list; other classifications have other goals.  
The contradiction between the clinical records and the DSM-V pointed out by Emerald is 
related to the fact that the Colombian Ministry of Health (2001) has ruled that the whole 
health system has to use the ICD-10 to register medical diagnoses. Consequently, all the 
health institutions have implemented technologies to record ICD-10 diagnoses in their 
clinical records; for example, it is common that clinics and hospitals adopt software that 
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restricts the diagnosis to the possibilities of the ICD-10.  In this order of ideas, Angelique 
claims that the Ministry of Health will not change the ICD-10 because it implies modifications 
in the whole informational infrastructure. Then, they have to deal with three active 
standardized classifications: the unstable DSM-V, the stable DSM-IV TR and the regulated 
ICD-10. 
Nevertheless, they do not admit different standards besides these three options. In this 
sense, Aaron’s presentation (lesson 4) did not accomplish changes to their practices. In that 
occasion, Aaron claimed that the GLDP was the mandatory classification for mental 
disorders; however, the psychiatrists sort it out as a local classification with specific goals 
that does not have the global status of the ICD and the DSM.  
Otherwise it is interesting that, unlike Emerald, Morpheus does not believe that the whole 
South American culture is oriented by North America; instead, he invites the residents to 
understand that it only orients Colombian psychiatry because other South American 
countries are performing different practices. 
2.2.10. Lesson 8: We have to label people, but we do not like it that much 
To conclude, Emerald and Morpheus said the following: 
Emerald: If there is a specialty that does not like to label it is Psychiatry, we always said “be 
careful to label that man as schizophrenic, Let us wait and see if he is going to be 
schizophrenic”. For example, when I talk to medical students about the personality of 
surgeons, I tell them that surgeons feel forced to define a diagnosis; in other words, the level 
of uncertainty that they can handle is zero “I cut or do not”, “this is appendicitis and that is 
it”, “I cannot wait three months to see if this is schizophrenia”. Then, for us the classification 
is helpful, an attempt at comprehension, but it is not the thing that we care for the most; we 
are focused on human beings, their suffering and how to help them without saying “you 
have…” The pharmaceutical industry demands that we classify to define what medications 
work for specific diseases; but, during the one thousand years before the standardized 
classifications, psychiatry worked through phenomenology and descriptions without the 
need to be so strict. 
Morpheus: That is one of the biggest mistakes of our health system, trying to link the 
medications to specific diseases because you can use a medication for many things, 
antidepressants have anxiolytic and hypnotic effects, they help with pain treatment, for the 
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OCD (Obsessive Compulsive Disorder)… Thus, if we label the patient with a diagnosis it is 
not because we need to quickly stick the patient in a diagnosis because sometimes the 
natural history of the disease can take two years to allow us to say “yes, it was 
schizophrenia”.  
The final lesson is the underlying message of all the lessons: psychiatrists care more about 
human beings, their suffering and how to help them than classifying. In this case, Emerald and 
Morpheus consider that ‘sorting patients out’ (cf. Bowker and Star, 1999) is an imposition of 
the health system more than an intrinsic necessity.  
2.3 How can STS categories help to understand this case?    
To conclude this chapter, I am going to discuss how the present case can be related with the 
STS literature. To assist with this project, I will discuss a series of questions constructed 
around the relationship between the observed practices and the STS categories; it is as 
follows:   
2.3.1 Can psychiatric standards be understood outside the psychiatric thought 
collective? The failure of a thought experiment 
One of the main conclusions of this ethnography is that psychiatric standardized 
classifications cannot be understood just by reading the instructions proposed by their 
designers; what this observation has taught us is that they only have meaning inside thought 
collectives (Fleck, 1986). To sustain this statement, Let us discuss the most extreme case by 
analyzing how an outsider can use these standards.  
In lessons 1 and 2 some of the participants have affirmed that the DSM-IV is so simple that 
even a “doorman” can use it. In particular, one of the professors has used this claim as a 
metaphor to point out to the residents that the mere use of the DSM-IV will not separate 
them from lay people because it is very simple and professional psychiatry is more complex. 
However in lesson 2, one resident argued that this metaphor could be literal if the doorman 
receives “short instructions”.  
When the resident tried to sustain this claim the character changed, it was not a “doorman” 
anymore but a “secretary” who will work for him in his future hypothetical private practice. 
Initially, this secretary does not know anything about psychiatry and the resident (or future 
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psychiatrist) will instruct her to do the triage (a screening test to decide what kind of disease 
a patient has); nevertheless, the instructions that the secretary will receive have some 
complexities. First, the DSM-IV has much technical language; thus, the resident will not give 
her the DSM-IV but a piece of paper with translations of the technical terms to the common 
language; for example, instead of the technical term “anhedonia”, it would say “the loss of 
interest in things which were interesting before”. But, how many technical words does the 
DSM-IV have? In an ad hoc manner, I will say that it has at least one hundred; so the 
secretary will have to learn at least the meaning of these one hundred words.  
To make this process shorter, the future psychiatrist will select for the secretary the ten most 
frequent diagnoses of his practice; but still, what would happen if a patient gives the 
secretary ambiguous information? According to the resident, it is common that relative to 
their regions patients use different expressions; for example, with the expression “the 
nervousness” patients may be referring to an anxiety symptom, but it can only be judged by a 
psychiatrist who will ask more questions to clarify what the patient is saying. Furthermore, it 
will be equally hard if the patient uses a technical term; for example, if the patient says that 
he felt “anxious”, how the secretary will know if it is the medical anxiety or the way in which 
the patient talks? Again, it is thanks to the psychiatrist’s expertise that it can be settled.  
Polanyi (2005) gives us some elements to understand the failures in this thought 
experiment. According to this author, it is only with the comparison between cases and 
guidance that physicians are able to distinguish between the normal and the pathological; 
therefore, the psychiatrist’s knowledge is required to identify what expressions of the 
patient may be evaluated as manifestations of a mental disorder and which ones cannot. In 
other words, it is only with experience and participation in the psychiatric thought collective 
that someone is able to fix together the meaning of the technical and the nontechnical 
language. 
The resident gives it a final try. To avoid the problem of meanings, he will give the secretary 
some scales based on the DSM-IV but designed to be used by anyone. This is a good idea 
because these scales do not have any technical language, so he can train the secretary to use 
them; however, the secretary will never be able to distinguish what are the effective and the 
ineffective scales; consequently, she will need the psychiatrist to select them for her. 
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In conclusion, outsiders will not be able to use the DSM-IV on their own; to use it, they will 
need training, translations and constant supervision from the insiders and even with this, it 
will be difficult. What about someone with some knowledge about psychiatry, for instance a 
general physician?       
The resident argues that DSM-IV can be taught to an outsider by a physician, but he also 
claimed that there are some mental disorders that only psychiatrists are able to intervene; 
for example, Dissociative Disorders or Hypochondria. Again, to be able to give the whole 
DSM-IV a sense, you will need to be a psychiatrist.  
2.3.2 How do psychiatry residents learn to use standards? Sociotechnical 
lessons, tacit and explicit knowledge 
What are those things that psychiatrists know about the standards that can only learned 
inside their collective? According to Fleck (1986), scientific training occurs in long 
solicitation processes inside thought collectives. The psychiatry thought collective from this 
case is composed of several psychiatrists who work in the program to produce the next 
generation of psychiatrists. To be part of this collective, the basic training lasts three years of 
exclusive dedication and to assure the acquisition of their particular thought style, 
psychiatry residents engage in many activities such as: rotations, seminars, topic review and 
case presentations16. In these activities, the residents have many lessons to adopt the 
practices that the collective considers valuable in regard to the standardized classification.  
Specifically, to observe the lessons inside this program, I have followed the arguments of two 
scholars: Prentice (2007) and Olesko (1993). According to Prentice, during their training 
scientists learn technical lessons and their social meanings simultaneously; using Latour’s 
(1992) terminology, I have called these lessons “sociotechnical”. Likewise, Olesko has 
claimed that scientific training happens through a combination of explicit and tactic 
knowledge.  
In chapter 1, I discussed how STS scholars understand explicit and tacit knowledge. On the 
one hand, explicit knowledge is information in the form of codes, words, formulas and 
symbols, it can be transmitted by impersonal media such as written documents or computer 
                                                          
16 This is without counting that psychiatry is a medical specialty; therefore, aspirants need to be graduate 
physicians to be even considered for the program.    
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files and it can be acquired through algorithmic strategies such as formal instructions or 
protocols (Delamont and Atkinson, 2001; MacKenzie and Spinardi, 1995). On the other hand, 
tacit knowledge is about mastering techniques without being able to articulate exactly how 
they are done, it can be transmitted only in personal circumstances and it has been 
compared with socialization and enculturation practices that require practical example, 
guidance, trust in authority, oral transmission, trial and error, learning by doing and 
negotiation among faculty and students (Campbell, 2003; Collins, 1974) Delamont and 
Atkinson, 2001; Polanyi, 2005). Finally, Collins (2010) classifies tacit knowledge into 
relational (RTK), somatic (STK) and collective tacit knowledge (CTK).   
Each of the eight lessons described in the present chapter can be understood as 
sociotechnical lessons involving a combination of tacit and explicit knowledge; but, to give an 
example of this point, let us discuss how it happened in lesson 1:   
“Lesson 1: Do not use telephones for psychiatric interview: DSM-IV, psychiatric anti-values 
and the way in which “gringos” do things”.  In this lesson a resident had a case presentation, 
while he was preparing this presentation he consulted the DSM-IV to diagnose the patient 
(written document/explicit knowledge). During the presentation the resident was asked by a 
professor if the information about the patient was collected in person or by phone, the 
resident answered that some parts were collected by phone and the professor got very angry 
because according to him, it was the kind of mistakes that the DSM-IV used to promote 
(guidance/tacit knowledge). Then, the professor told the resident that he must stop using the 
DSM-IV because it was making him mechanistic (psychiatric anti-value/social meaning) and 
it will not help him understand patients’ experience (psychiatric value/social meaning). 
On the instruction of the professor, the resident repeated the presentation (guidance/tacit 
knowledge). In the second presentation, the resident claimed that the way in which he 
addressed the case the first time was superficial because he had not understood the patient 
(trial and error/tacit knowledge).  
In this case, the technical skill that the resident had to learn was to not use telephones for 
psychiatric interviewing; nevertheless, this lesson did not come alone, to use telephones for 
psychiatric interviews had social implications and it was equivalent to being mechanistic. In 
other words, by using the telephone for the interview, the resident failed in meeting a 
psychiatric core value: He was failing to understand the patient. 
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The explicit knowledge from this lesson was to read the DSM-IV to produce a diagnosis, but 
the resident did not know that the DSM-IV’s use represented the psychiatric anti-values. 
Then, by the guidance of the professor and by trial and error, the resident integrated the tacit 
knowledge of this lesson to his practice. 
In regard to the three types of tacit knowledge described by Collins (RTK, STK and CTK), the 
only one that worked for the present case was the CTK. The RTK was not a problem for 
residents because they were immersed in the practice in a constant relationship with their 
professors; therefore, there were no communication difficulties due to lack of personal 
interaction. Likewise, the STK was not relevant for this case because, unlike surgeons, 
psychiatrists do not need to develop any particular physical skill to succeed in their practice. 
Lastly, the CTK was a core concept to understand how residents developed knowledge about 
the contextual variances inside the program; as an example let us discuss what happened in 
lesson 2: 
“Lesson 2: Can I carry the DSM-IV around? Identifying the DSM-IV contexts, uses and users”. 
Initially in this lesson there was a resident who carried the DSM-IV with him all the time. 
Then, thanks to his practical experience and the instruction of the professors he stopped 
using it because it was leading him to make mistakes. Finally, he realized that the DSM-IV’s 
use depended on the context; for example, it was prohibited by the psychiatrists of the clinic, 
it was mandatory for the psychiatrists in the case presentations of the academic meetings, it 
was desirable for research and to face new situations; but on balance, it was mechanistic and 
a fountain of mistakes. 
2.3.3 Do psychiatric standards vary according to the community of practice? 
The clinic and the academic meetings 
Lesson 2 also gives us a hint of how the meaning of the standards varies according to the 
context. In this sense, Star and Lampland (2009) argue that the meaning of standards is 
relative to the users and the community of practice. In the program, the meanings of the 
standards have huge variations in regard to two (sub) communities of practice: the clinic and 
the academic meetings. On the one hand, in the clinic, the psychiatrists are constantly 
discouraging the residents about the use of standards; on the other hand, in the academic 
meetings, the residents must use the standards, but they are instructed by the professors to 
be very careful with their use.  
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An example of the differences between the ways in which these communities (or factions of 
the same community) construct the standards is the confidence that they have in the DSM’s 
designers; to discuss it, I am going to compare how this topic was addressed in Lesson 3 
(that happened in the clinic) and in lesson 5 (that happened in the academic meetings). 
 “Lesson 3: The DSMI-IV is an interested standard”. In this lesson a psychiatrist argued that 
the DSM-IV is a fallacy of many interests because it is influenced by insurance companies, 
pharmaceutical companies, political groups (such as gay groups) and Jews. An example of 
this influence is the disappearance of the diagnosis of Postpartum Depression in the 
transition from the DSM-III to the DSM-IV. The professor explains this disappearance due to 
the influence of the insurance companies that were spending too much money to treat this 
disorder and pressured the DSM-IV’s designers for its declassification. According to the 
professor, in the end psychiatrists cannot treat women that get depressed after giving birth 
in an effective way because the diagnosis does not exist anymore. 
This lesson is an example of how the practical politics (Bowker and Star, 1999) in the 
production of the standards can be visible again in a concrete context as the clinic. In this 
case, the negotiations between the insurance companies and the DSM-IV’s designers are 
made explicit by the professor who discredits the DSM-IV as a standard that obeys more to 
economic interests over facts and patients welfare.  
In contrast, the psychiatrists from the academic meetings do not agree with this argument. 
For example, in lesson 5 a psychiatrist described her experience in the last national 
psychiatry congress. In this congress, some of the Latin American experts that participated in 
the DSM-V’s construction gave testimony of the intimacies and the discussions inside the 
DSM work groups. For this psychiatrist, the experts’ openness gives the DSM-V credibility 
and, despite the pressure of the pharmaceutical and insurance industries, she believes in the 
good intentions of the designers because they know what this implicates in people’s life.  
If we compare both positions in regard to the credibility, the psychiatrist of the clinic 
presents the DSM-IV as a malicious device product of economic interests while the 
psychiatrist of the academic meetings presents the DSM-V as the product of serious work 
despite the external pressures.   
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It is particularly interesting that these discourses of credibility vs incredibility sustain a 
division between the internal and the external components of science. The internal being the 
scientific component, in this case the DSM work groups; and the external being the social and 
nonscientific forces that can threaten the good intentions of scientists, in this case the 
pharmaceutical and insurance companies. In front of this division, STS scholars (For instance 
Bloor, 1998; Latour and Woolgar, 1995; Shapin, 1994; Pinch, 1993) argue that science is a 
hybrid of the social and the technical; for example the ICD (Bowker and Star, 1999) is the 
product of the combination between statistical work and the interests of many actors, but 
these interests do not make it right or wrong; what this means is that the social and the 
technical are equally important in the construction of scientific facts.   
2.3.4 How do standards reorder practices? The (temporal) breakdown 
between the ICD-10, the DSM-IV and the DSM-V   
Timmermans and Berg (2003) argue that standards reorder practices; this can be seen in 
Lesson 5 in which the publication of the DSM-V motivated a series of discussions in the 
academic meetings to deliberate about its impact in the psychiatric practice. In this lesson 
the members of the program discussed how the introduction of the DSM-V implied the 
redefinition of the boundaries of the mental disorders; for example, some of the categories 
gained or lost status, the definition of some disorders changed and some of the symptoms 
that defined the diseases were modified. 
The DSM-V designers argue that the changes have been motivated by the empirical evidence; 
nevertheless, the members of the program are not sure of this evidence because for them it 
has many inconsistencies; for example, one of them doubted the existence of empirical 
evidence (epidemiological studies) of a diagnosis that had not been classified until the DSM-
V’s publication. 
The inconsistences in the designers’ argumentation and the adaptation to the changes 
produced a sensation of uncertainty in the program that has been manifested as: it is still 
“green” (see footnote 12), “it keeps being polemic”, it is in a “gray stage” (see footnote 13) 
that makes it hard to use and it is not appropriate for general physicians until it becomes 
clearer.  
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In Latour’s (1992) terminology, the feeling of uncertainty in the program can be understood 
as “science in action”, in other words, this is the moment when things are not so stable and 
the facts do not look so solid. Still, they expect, as it has happened with the previous editions 
of the DSM, that in the future the DSM-V is going to be the main classification in the field.  
The members of the program do not agree on how long it will take for the DSM-V to become 
stable; the psychiatrists of the group estimate that it will take at least three years; 
nevertheless, with the worldwide reach of the internet, it can be faster because now all the 
psychiatrists possess their own version of the classification since its publication. As Bowker 
and Star (1999) pointed out with the diffusion of the ICD, the DSM-V acceptance is 
conditioned by the information infrastructures; in this case, the internet may facilitate the 
DSM-V’s diffusion.     
Another situation generated by the introduction of the DSM-V is that psychiatrists have to 
deal with three standardized classifications: The DSM-IV TR, the DSM-V and the ICD-10. Now, 
it is particular that the most controverted classification inside the program is the DSM series 
and often the ICD-10 is referenced just as a requirement for the health system. Concerning 
this, Bowker and Star (1999) argue that standards and classifications are usually invisible 
until they break down; the introduction of the DSM-V generated a sort of temporal break 
down in this program because it puts the three classifications in tension; The ICD-10, the 
DSM-IV TR and the DSM-V. 
Psychiatrists feel that they must learn how to use the DSM-V because it is going to be the 
main classification in the field in the forthcoming years; however, it is still an unstable 
classification. The DSM-IV is the current referent in the field; therefore, it is the one that they 
are going to keep implementing. And the ICD-10 is the one ruled by the Ministry of Health 
(2001) for the diagnosis in the health system; hence, they have to use it in their daily practice 
to fill clinical records (reinforced by legal systems).    
But, how does this work? How do they handle the three standards? Before, the psychiatrists 
of this program had to use the DSM-IV and the ICD-10. In this context, what they used to do 
was to implement the DSM-IV model and translate it to the ICD-10 terms for the clinical 
record. This translation was possible because the DSM and the ICD designers have provided 
harmonization sections to allow the mutual translations of the diagnoses. The DSM-V also 
has a harmonization section with the ICD-10, but it is mainly designed to be articulated with 
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the not yet published ICD-11; thus, the DSM-V translation to the ICD-10 will not be as smooth 
as it was between the DSM-IV and the ICD-10. 
This situation worries the psychiatrists since they have been notified by the Ministry of 
Health that the ICD-10 will not change because it is too expensive to modify the whole 
software of the health system that is based on the ICD-10. According to Bowker and Star 
(1999), this is the material (in this case digital) force of standards; standards are expensive 
and difficult to change because they are everywhere, not only in the discussions of the 
psychiatrists (symbolic form), but also in the clinical records, the software and the health 
statistics (material form). 
In conclusion, this variety of standards is handled by the psychiatrists establishing different 
roles for each one: The DSM-IV is the current and stable referent, the DSM-V is the future and 
still unstable referent and the ICD-10 is a regulated requirement. 
What about other classifications such as the Latin American Guide for Psychiatric Diagnosis? 
Do not they complicate the scene even more? Despite the attempts of the resident from 
Lesson 4 who tried to convince the members of the program that the GLDP was better and 
even mandatory, in Lesson 7 the psychiatrists have identified the GLDP and other 
classifications different from the ICD and the DSM as local classifications with specific goals. 
In contrast, the ICD and DSM are seen as general classifications with the goal of being global 
referents. 
2.3.5 Is the DSM series the product of scientific evolution? Standards and 
historical reconstructions  
The introduction of the DSM-V is also an opportunity for the reconstruction of the DSM 
history. The psychiatrists from the academic meetings claim that the DSM changes in an 
evolving progression: First there were two “boxes”, “neurosis” and “psychosis”; then, 
researchers found that the content of these categories was so heterogonous that it needed to 
be separated with more categories; finally, the new categories are confirmed or excluded by 
epidemiological researches.  In terms of the history of science, this is a progressivist position 
in which the current state of knowledge is the product of a long, collective and evolutionary 
effort in which the actual classifications have been built “block” by “block”.  
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In contrast, DSM historians (Kirk and Kutchins, 2008; Kutchins and Kirk, 1997; Rogler, 1997; 
Strand, 2011) have argued that there is a discontinuity in the transition between the DSM-II 
and the DSM-III since it changed from a psychoanalytic perspective that understood 
disorders as the product of intrapsychic conflicts to a descriptive categorization which only 
takes into account biological explanations.       
In some measure, using Kuhn’s (2000) terminology, this rupture can be understood as a 
scientific revolution. In a simplified version of Kuhn’s scheme science works in three phases: 
Normal science, abnormal science and scientific revolutions. In the phase of normal science, 
the scientists from a scientific community follow a paradigm. A paradigm is a way of 
practicing science in which a scientific community shares similar epistemological 
commitments, uses the same methods and instruments, perceives facts similarly and tries to 
solve a set of related problems. The phase of abnormal science begins when, after many 
attempts, scientists start doubting the possibility of solving the most compromising 
anomalies17 of the paradigm; then, a period of uncertainty in which the foundations of the 
paradigm are questioned starts. To deal with the uncertainty, scientists propose new 
paradigms that promise to solve some of the core anomalies and if one of these gain enough 
followers, a scientific revolution that positions the new paradigm as the paradigm of the field 
can be produced. 
Kuhn (2000) compares the experience of the defenders of the previous and the new 
paradigm with people who live in different worlds; they do not just disagree over the 
conceptual frameworks to understand facts, but perceive and practice different realities. 
Kuhn calls this the incommensurability between paradigms. For example, psychoanalysts are 
concerned with understanding patients’ particularity by their discourse while the DSM-IV 
practitioners are focused on identifying disorders by quantifying symptoms.             
The transition from one paradigm to another is not an issue of crucial experiments which 
prove that the previous paradigm was wrong; instead, a paradigm is replaced by the action 
of complex tissues that go beyond scientific disciplines (Kuhn, 1978). For instance, I pointed 
out the importance of social actors such as the gay groups in the transformation of DSM 
categories. 
                                                          
17 Evidence that contradicts the predictions of the paradigm   
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In this sense, scientific revolutions are not abrupt ruptures (Kuhn, 2000) but progressive 
processes. For instance, Rogler (1997) claims that there were changes in the transition from 
the DSM-I to the DSM-II that set the ground for the DSM-III’s revolution such as the 
elimination of the definition of the mental disorders as the “reaction” to biopsychosocial 
factors because it implicated a theoretical hypothesis. Likewise, according to Kuhn (2000), 
the new paradigm is not automatically embraced; scientists need a long reeducation process 
to learn to “see” the world in the new paradigm’s way. Nonetheless, at the end, not all the 
members of a scientific community will adopt the new paradigm; for example, 
psychoanalysis lost the psychiatric leadership but, it is still part of psychiatric training in 
many programs. 
Finally, Kuhn (2000) proposes that each paradigm shift produces a change in the history of 
the field since the past paradigms are interpreted as an extension of the new paradigm. In 
this case, by presenting the DSM changes as the product of scientific progress, the 
psychiatrists are giving the field an identity that persists over time, a sensation of both 
advancement and continuity, and an image of technicality in which the social is not a part of 
its history. 
2.3.6 Are there any relationships between the different international 
psychiatric schools and the psychiatric standardized classifications?  A 
South-North exchange  
The relationships between the psychiatric standards and the international psychiatric 
schools were an overarching issue in the lessons; in particular, the psychiatrists and the 
residents from this program were concerned with the relationships between the DSM and 
the US psychiatric school. 
Although it is not a rule, the scientific relationships between South and North America have 
been marked by an asymmetry in which the North is considered to be a referent in the 
production of knowledge while the South is understood as a receiver of knowledge. In this 
sense, the relationships between both subcontinents are not only material, for example 
about the possession of the best technology, but also symbolic, for instance about which one 
has better ideas.      
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In this order of ideas, De Greiff and Nieto (2005) claim that the technoscientific exchange 
between South and North18 must be understood taking into account that science and 
technology are inseparable from the exercise of authority, control and domination. In this 
context, the DSM can be understood as an attempt by US psychiatry to expand its model all 
over the world.  
To achieve authority in different contexts, it is not enough to have the intention of expansion; 
the other component of this equation is how science and technology circulates in each 
context. Concerning this, Restrepo (2000) argues that in great degree, the position of 
subordination that some Latin American scientists have embraced depends on a self-image 
of inferiority. Then, the positions that the psychiatrists of this program assume in regard to 
the DSM and its relationship with the US psychiatric school are related with the degree to 
which they are accepting of US authority; I have identified six positions: 
1. The DSM-IV is an “attempt” for the “unification of psychiatric language” in western 
psychiatry. 
In lesson 2 the DSM-IV was presented as an attempt for the “unification of psychiatric 
language” in western psychiatry with the goal of comparing mental disorders worldwide for 
research. In this context, the word “attempt” means that this goal is not entirely achieved 
since the mental disorder of a patient is never identical to the mental disorder of another, 
even if both have the same diagnosis. Now, in this statement the origin of the standard is not 
problematic and the DSM is understood as a device that allows communication among 
psychiatrists; the only delimitation is that it is a western consensus, but in this case, the west 
is considered to be “almost the entire world”. 
2. Latin America is culturally dominated by North America therefore the DSM-V is going to 
be accepted  
In lesson 5 it was argued that the DSM-V is going to be imposed because “Latin America is in 
a great degree commanded by the North American culture”. In this affirmation, the origin of 
the standard is present, but it is only to claim that North America has a great influence over 
                                                          
18 The South-North relationships are concepts designed to challenge the traditional image in which the supremacy 
of the North and the subordination of the South are automatically considered. 
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Latin American culture and therefore the North American standard is going to be accepted in 
the Latin American context. 
3. North American leadership is only over Colombia 
In lesson 7 it was argued that even if Colombia has a North American orientation and uses 
the DSM, it does not mean that it is the same in the rest of South America. This argument 
implies the recognition that Latin America is not a uniform mass commanded by North 
America; instead, it is only Colombian psychiatry that follows a North American orientation. 
4. The GLDP is a standard that takes into account the international tendencies and the 
local dynamics  
In lesson 4 it was proposed that the Latin American Guide for Psychiatric Diagnosis (GLDP) is 
better in comparison to the DSM-IV. Among the arguments to sustain this evaluation, it was 
claimed that the GLDP followed guidelines similar to the ones of the DSM-IV and the ICD-10, 
but also the ones from the Latin American psychiatric classifications such as the Cuban 
Glossary for Psychotic Diagnosis. Thus, the GLDP is a standard that takes into account the 
international orientations and the local dynamics. 
5. The North American school uses the DSM-IV more because it is mechanistic and the 
European school uses it less because it is holistic 
In lesson 2 it was affirmed that the North American psychiatric school, especially the one 
from the United States, tends to be mechanistic and therefore uses the DSM a lot; in contrast, 
the European psychiatric school, especially the one from France, is concerned with the 
understanding of patients and therefore uses the DSM less. Finally, some US psychiatric 
schools are not teaching the DSM-IV anymore because they are starting to realize that it is 
mechanistic. In this position, the DSM and the US psychiatric school are clearly rejected 
because they do not meet the psychiatric values; instead it is proposed to follow a European 
orientation that respects these values. 
6. The DSM-IV represents the “gringal” way and the psychiatric anti-values  
In lesson 1 the use of the DSM-IV was proscribed by a professor because for him it 
represented the “gringal” way. The word “gringal” is a derogative way to talk about how 
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people from the United States do things since it came from the expression “green go”; in 
other words, the rejection of US people and their dollars. In this lesson, the “gringal” way in 
psychiatry is a reference to the interest in earning money fast and easy over the 
understanding and the welfare of patients. In this position, the DSM and US school are 
frankly deauthorized and even demonized. 
The six positions denote that there is no agreement inside the program about their position 
regarding the US psychiatric school and its standard. On the one extreme, there is an 
acceptance of the standard as a tool to allow communication among western psychiatrists, 
nevertheless, in this context the west is considered to be “almost the entire world”. 
Concerning this, paraphrasing Nieto and Thomas (2005) and Restrepo (2000) in an 
argument used to understand eurocentrism, the risk of North American-centrism is not to be 
excluded, but to be assimilated in a unique perspective of the world; in this case, the DSM is a 
device for the communication of psychiatrists around the world and the location of origin is 
not important; in other words, it is not a US standard but a west (world) standard.  
Slowly the universality of the DSM decreases. In the second position, the US dominion is only 
over Latin America, but it is a general (“cultural”) domain in which psychiatry is only a part; 
therefore, the US psychiatric standard is used in Latin America. In the third position, the 
domain of the US psychiatry school by the DSM is only circumscribed to Colombia and not all 
of Latin America; therefore, the DSM is used in Colombia. In the fourth position, it is 
recognized that the DSM (and the ICD) represents the international tendencies, but it is 
equally important to take into account classifications sensitive to the local dynamics; 
therefore the GLDP is better than the DSM because it articulates both. In the fifth position, 
the DSM is located only in the US psychiatric school, but it is not the orientation that 
psychiatrists must follow; instead they should follow the European school. Lastly, in the sixth 
position, the US psychiatric school and the DSM are rejected because they represent a 
greater concern with earning money easily than the understanding and welfare of patients.       
2.3.7 What is the core lesson that psychiatrists must learn in this program 
about psychiatric standards? Standards and users’ resistance 
The last lesson “Lesson 8: We have to label people, but we do not like it that much” is a 
synthesis of the lessons from this case; it has two components: “We have to label people” and 
“but, we do not like it that much”. 
69 
 
 
 
The first part of the statement “we have to label people” represents the whole practical force 
of the standards. Busch (2011) argues that standards set down the categories from which 
others have to choose; in this case, psychiatrists must use the ICD-10 because it is ruled by 
the Ministry of Health and the DSM-IV (and in the future the DSM-V) because it is a referent of 
the field for communication with other psychiatrists.  
In contrast, the second part of the statement “but, we do not like it that much”, represents the 
resistance that psychiatrists have towards the standards (Bowker and Star 1999). We have 
discussed several examples inside the program: they reject the DSM because it represents the 
US values, they do not trust the DSM because it leads them to make mistakes, they use the 
social component of the DSM to claim that it is ill willed, they propose the use of Latin 
American standards (GLDP) instead of the international standard (DSM and ICD), they do not 
trust the DSM’s empirical foundation and argue that the ICD is just a formal requisite of the 
health system. Likewise, Whooley (2010) has pointed out that psychiatrists from another 
context (New York) resist the standards by doing several “workarounds”; for example, they 
use their own taxonomies and then translate them into DSM terms, they use few categories 
reducing the hundreds of options given by DSM, among many other practices. 
In this order of ideas, Bowker and Star (1999) have argued that the reception of the standard 
depends on the gatekeepers of the practice. In this program, the professors constantly 
regulate the meaning of the DSM by instructions, sanctions, and negotiations with the 
residents. 
In conclusion, the psychiatric standards are not automatically accepted because they do not 
arrive in empty spaces; instead, they are transformed depending of the practices of each local 
context.  
2.3.8 Finally, is this thesis a social construction? 
In some research traditions methods are seen as a way of knowing reality and in the most 
extreme positivist branches they have even been embraced as a protection against 
subjectivity, social dynamics and historical contexts. In contrast, by following some STS 
scholars (Latour and Woolgar, 1995; Law, 2004; Mol, 2002), in the present thesis methods 
have been understood as ways of constructing realities; I have reviewed two examples: with 
Latour and Woolgar (1995) I have discussed how measuring with a radiation detector in a 
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laboratory  changes the organic material from a rat into a two dimensional graphic and; with 
Mol (2002) I have pointed out how an unspecific pain caused by walking can be reshaped 
during a medical interview into a condition called “Intermittent Claudication”. A third 
example can be the case study from this chapter in which there was a psychiatry program 
that was reshaped with some STS categories and specific observational practices. 
The first way in which the present thesis transformed the program was with my presence. On 
the one hand, my physical presence filled a space (especially because of the tripod of my 
camera) and hindered the free traffic in the clinic and; on the other hand, sometimes the 
clinical staff felt that my video camera put their anonymity in danger. Likewise, for them I 
was observing their activities as a psychologist; therefore it is possible that they might have 
felt evaluated and probably tried to make ‘politically correct’ statements in front of me.     
The second way in which this thesis transformed the program was with my sociomaterial 
practices (Mol, 2002): It was shaped by my training in which I learned to make present some 
realities and leave others aside (Law, 2004), by my informational devices that captured some 
parts of the situations and not the whole experience, by the remaining digital and physical 
traces that were not the same as the initial situations (Ashmore and Reed, 2000), by the work 
made with the research software Atlas ti, by the bidirectional translations English-Spanish, by 
my advisor’s suggestions, by your active reading and by many other things that have been 
overlooked.    
In conclusion, just like psychiatric standards, this thesis did not occur in a vacuum, it is the 
product of the conjunction between a psychiatric training program in which psychiatric 
standardized classifications are used, STS categories, specific observational practices and 
your interpretation of the text. 
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3. Possible research directions in the conjunction of 
STS, scientific training and psychiatric standards  
This chapter briefly describes possible research directions to continue the work on the 
relationships between STS, scientific training and psychiatric standards. These directions are 
constructed based on the experience of writing an STS thesis and the case study from chapter 
two.  
3.1 Reception of the DSM in Colombia: The DSM did not arrive 
in an empty space    
In chapter two I argued that, despite the ICD-10 being the standard ruled by the Ministry of 
Health (2001) to record the diagnoses in the Colombian health system, the DSM-IV is the 
most used, though controversial, standardized classification in Colombia. In this sense, many 
of the lessons from chapter two were devoted to teach the residents from the psychiatry 
program how they must understand the DSM; in particular, these lessons were focused on 
how psychiatrists should resist this standard. Then, at least in this program, the DSM has not 
been smoothly embraced.  
A professor of the program argued that, like the DSM-III, DSM-IV and the DSM-IV TR, the 
DSM-V will be imposed because of the cultural influence that North America has over Latin 
America; but, is this enough to explain the impact that the DSM has had in Colombia? Star 
and Lampland (2009) argue that standards are relative to the community of practice; then, 
how has the DSM been received in the Colombian psychiatric communities? How have they 
transformed the DSM? To help us with these questions Bowker and Star (1999) have told us 
that standards are established not by natural laws but by social contingencies such as being 
installed in an already established base, by having better marketing and by the regulation of 
the gatekeepers; then, what contingencies favored the DSM’s positioning in Colombia? These 
are some of the questions that will be discussed in the present chapter. 
The method to address these questions can be a hybrid and it will include the review of the 
study plans of some Colombian psychiatry programs, the review of specialized journals that 
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have addressed the DSM (for example the Colombian Psychiatry Journal19), the way in which 
public media has presented the DSM, contact with the Colombian groups that have worked 
on the DSM construction and interviews with key actors.  
3.2 The Latin American Guide for Psychiatric Diagnosis as a way 
to challenge the reception discourse 
In chapter two a resident proposed that instead of the DSM-IV, a psychiatrist from the 
program should use the Latin American Guide for Psychiatric diagnosis (GLDP) because it is 
more flexible, it is mandatory by law, it includes a narrative diagnosis that allows the user to 
include several explanations and it is a standard that takes into account the international 
tendencies (the DSM-IV and ICD-10 guidelines) and the local dynamics (Latin American 
psychiatric classifications such as the Cuban Glossary for psychiatric diagnosis). However, 
the psychiatrists from the program did not embrace this proposal because for them the GLDP 
is a local classification with specific goals while the general classifications are the DSM-IV 
and the ICD-10. 
There are not many articles that quote the GLDP. The one that addresses it in a wider way is 
“The Latin American Guide for Psychiatric Diagnosis and its revision”20 (Otero, Saavedra, 
Mezzich and Salloum, 2011). The authors of this article are some of those currently 
responsible for the GLDP-VR (revised version) and the forthcoming second edition. These 
authors identify two moments of the GLDP’s history: In the first moment Latin American 
psychiatrists were not looking for a unified standard but many isolated classifications such 
as the Cuban Glossary for Psychiatric Diagnosis were produced. In the second moment, Latin 
American psychiatry archived scientific “maturity” allowing the unified construction of the 
GLDP.  
Both references to the GLDP (in the program and in the article) make me think that it is a 
device by which the Latin American psychiatrists deal with knowledge coming from other 
psychiatric schools. In the situation of the resident, it was argued that the GLDP is a 
classification that embodies global and local dynamics simultaneously and therefore it is 
better than a classification (the DSM-IV) that is not sensitive to Latin American 
particularities. In the article it is claimed that the Latin American psychiatric school is 
                                                          
19 In Spanish: Revista Colombiana de psiquiatría  
20 In Spanish: La Guía Latinoamericana de Diagnóstico Psiquiátrico y su proceso de revisión 
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mature enough to have a classification on the same level of the ICD-10 and the DSM-IV. 
Hence, the GLDP seems to be an attempt to position Latin American psychiatry as an 
international psychiatric school able to produce its own knowledge.   
Now, De Greiff and Nieto (2005) argue that science and technology are inseparable from the 
exercise of authority, control and domination. In this sense one may wonder: is the GLDP a 
way by which Latin American psychiatry has responded to the authority of the North 
American and European psychiatric schools? This chapter will address this question by 
reviewing the acts of the meetings for the construction of the GLDP, the articles that quoted 
the GLDP and interviews with key actors.  
3.3 Writing about scientific training or learning to write an STS 
thesis 
One of the four principles proposed by Bloor (1998) to avoid the self-refutation of Sociology 
of Knowledge that studies the content of science, is reflexivity. For Bloor, reflexivity means 
that the explanations used to understand the production of knowledge are also applicable to 
the construction of one’s own knowledge; in other words, you cannot treat the knowledge 
produced by others as a relative construction and your own knowledge as something real.  
In this order of ideas, while I was elaborating this thesis about psychiatric training, I realized 
that the way in which I was writing it, the methods that I used and the categories that I 
decided to discuss were the product of my own socialization inside STS. Hence, as I did with 
psychiatric training, this socialization can be understood with categories such as thought 
collective, thought style, sociotechnical lessons and tacit and explicit knowledge. 
Thus, a possible research direction of the present thesis could be an ethnography of the 
practices implemented in an STS program to train the students in the elaboration of an STS 
thesis. This ethnography will include: the observation of the classes inside the program 
(especially the research seminars), the observation of the meetings between the students and 
the tutors, interviews with students and professors, the revision of the drafts of the theses, 
the final accepted thesis and the observation of the informal groups devoted to discuss how 
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to write the theses (for example, my fellows carried out weekly meetings called “GESCTM21 
alternative seminar” to help each other with their theses). From this material, I already 
possess some STS theses from members of the program in which I was trained; Let us discuss 
concisely how they can contribute to this chapter: 
The first thesis is “Colombian Psychology: Knowledge, technique and controversies; 
reconstruction from Social Studies of Science” written by my colleague Fredy Mora (2012). In 
this thesis Mora claims that his training in STS produced in him “an ontological twist” and a 
“subjective reconfiguration”. According to him, when he entered in “contact” with STS 
categories everything he knew about psychology seemed to be in danger (he is a graduate 
psychologist like me). Then, thanks to different STS approaches, the things that once he 
considered “impenetrable truths” were transformed into an “interesting, dynamic and 
passionate way to talk about psychology”. Finally, STS changed his experience of research 
from a “rational exercise of science” to a “life project-approach”. 
This short self-report gives me an idea of the path that an STS scholar may walk through STS. 
The statements of an “ontological twist” and “subjective reconfiguration” imply that in STS he 
had to change his conception of how things were and this produced a transformation of his 
own self-perception. This started with a sensation of uncertainty produced by his contact 
with STS categories; then, the sensation of uncertainty became interest and finally it turned 
into his own life.    
The second thesis is “On writing review articles and constructing fields of study” (PhD 
dissertation) of my professor Olga Restrepo (2003). In this thesis Restrepo argues that by 
reading STS scholars such as Bloor, Collins and Woolgar, she has learned how not strictly to 
follow rules for reading in a “reasonable” manner, whereby she developed a way of reading 
that alternates between being an obedient reader and being an awkward reader. Thus, STS 
training is also a matter of learning to read texts differently. 
The final example is the present thesis. In this thesis I affirmed that by reading scholars such 
as Kuhn, Fleck, Bloor and Pinch, I learned that there is not a reality to unveil but different 
realities constructed by different groups and that sometimes the reality of one group may 
                                                          
21 The GESCTM (In Spanish Grupo de Estudios Sociales de la Ciencia la Tecnología y la Medicina) is the acronym of 
the Group of Social Studies of Science, Technology and Medicine; the official research group attached to the 
Master.     
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enter in conflict with the reality of another. Finally, I realized the goodness or badness of an 
object depends on the practices of different social groups and their commitment to specific 
forms of reality. Hence, STS training implies a change in the conception of reality. 
Reading the arguments from these theses with the categories of tacit and explicit knowledge, 
I found a pattern in the way in which these scholars point out the changes that they 
experienced inside STS: Mora claimed that his “ontological” and “subjective” changes started 
by his “contact” with STS categories, Restrepo argued that by reading STS scholars she 
developed a particular reading style and I affirmed that reading STS scholars transformed my 
construction of reality. Nevertheless, these three arguments point to explicit knowledge; 
“contact” with categories and “reading” STS scholars talks about the impersonal medias that 
contribute to the training; but, Where are the sociotechnical lessons and the personal means 
by which tacit knowledge is acquired? Answering this question will be one of the goals of this 
chapter. 
Now, following Bloor, Mulkay (1985), Woolgar (1988) and Ashmore (1989) have taken 
reflexivity a step forward by using “new literary forms”, a different way from the standard 
(realist) format to present research reports that includes resources such as plays, limericks, 
parodies, parables, dialogues, anti-prefaces, anti-introductions, parallel texts, encyclopedias, 
examinations, lectures, press reports and even talking with ghosts and books. These “new 
literary forms” are an option to talk about one’s own knowledge as something constructed in 
a relative way by accepting that the fictional and the factual are two possible approaches to 
address reality.         
An option to embrace a “new literary form” for this chapter could be to write about an STS 
student who received a suggestion from one of her professors to write about how STS 
students learn to write theses. This hypothetical student will find an STS thesis written by a 
graduated STS scholar called Daza who already wrote a standard research report about this 
topic. The student will discuss what she is reading with her peers and professors and finally 
this exercise will shape her own thesis and her experience inside STS. 
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